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ARTICLE 
NO EXIT? 
WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATIONS 
Douglas G. Baird* & Anthony J. Casey** 
Bankruptcy scholarship is largely a debate about the comparative 
merits of a mandatory regime on one hand and bankruptcy by free de-
sign on the other. By the standard account, the current law of corporate 
reorganization is mandatory. Various rules that cannot be avoided en-
sure that investors’ actions are limited and they do not exercise their 
rights against specialized assets in a way that destroys the value of a 
business as a whole. These rules solve collective action problems and re-
duce the risk of bargaining failure. But there are costs to a mandatory 
regime. In particular, investors cannot design their rights to achieve op-
timal monitoring as they could in a system of bankruptcy by free design. 
This Article suggests that the academic debate has missed a fun-
damental feature of the law. Bankruptcy operates on legal entities, not 
on firms in the economic sense. For this reason, sophisticated investors 
do not face a mandatory regime at all. The ability of investors to place 
assets in separate entities gives them the ability to create specific with-
drawal rights in the event the firm encounters financial distress. There 
is nothing mandatory about rules like the automatic stay when assets 
can be partitioned off into legal entities that are beyond the reach of the 
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bankruptcy judge. Thus, by partitioning assets of one economic enter-
prise into different legal entities, investors can create a tailored bank-
ruptcy regime. In this way, legal entities serve as building blocks that 
can be combined to create specific and varied but transparent investor 
withdrawal rights. This regime of tailored bankruptcy has been un-
recognized and underappreciated and may be preferable to both man-
datory and free design regimes. By allowing a limited number of inves-
tors to opt out of bankruptcy in a particular, discrete, and visible way, 
investors as a group may be able to both limit the risk of bargaining 
failure and at the same time enjoy the disciplining effect that a with-
drawal right brings with it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Los Angeles Dodgers entered bankruptcy, the filing re-
vealed that its income depended crucially on three assets: the team itself, 
its stadium, and the adjoining parking lot. The team cannot play without 
a stadium to house the spectators, and the spectators need a place to 
park.1 None of the assets is worth much without the other two. No other 
                                                                                                                 
1. Stadiums in other cities (such as Wrigley Field in Chicago) are accessible by public 
transportation or by foot, but not Dodger Stadium. It is located in Chavez Ravine. Apart 
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stadium in Los Angeles is suitable for baseball, and Dodger Stadium is 
not well suited for anything other than baseball. The parking lot is 
necessary for those who want to watch baseball at Dodger Stadium but 
useless to everyone else. Different investors hold interests in each of 
these three assets.  
By the standard account, the law of corporate reorganizations is well 
equipped to handle a financially distressed enterprise with such a con-
figuration of highly specialized assets. Chapter 11 prevents investors from 
exercising their rights in a way that destroys the value of the business as a 
whole.2 Various rules—especially the automatic stay3—keep the firm to-
gether while its financial affairs are sorted out. Investors thus lose the 
ability to withdraw from their investment and must instead work together 
to create a new capital structure for the firm.4 Bankruptcy law respects 
the value of each investor’s rights while preventing investors from taking 
actions that reduce the value of the business as a whole.5 Closer examina-
tion of the Dodgers, however, tells a rather different story. Bankruptcy 
was doing little to keep the assets together. While the Dodgers were one 
economic enterprise, the critical assets—the parking lot, the stadium, 
and the team—were housed in separate legal entities.6 The limited 
liability company that owned the team filed one bankruptcy petition, the 
                                                                                                                 
from an express bus from Union Station, the only way there is by car. The frequently asked 
questions page on the part of the Dodgers’ website devoted to transportation focuses only 
on parking. See Transportation—FAQs, Dodgers.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/la/ballpark/
transportation/index.jsp?content=faq (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012).  
2. The idea that bankruptcy exists to solve this kind of collective action problem 
among creditors is one of the foundational ideas of bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Thomas H. 
Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 5 (1986) (noting goal of bankruptcy “is 
to permit the owners of assets to use those assets in a way that is most productive to them 
as a group in the face of incentives by individual owners to maximize their own positions”). 
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
4. The right to withdraw an investment upon default is a common characteristic of 
debt agreements. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (describing common use of 
covenants that trigger withdrawal rights). The suspension of these withdrawal rights is a 
central principle of bankruptcy law. See supra note 2. 
5. See supra note 2 (noting collective action problem). 
6. At the time of bankruptcy, through a variety of holding companies, they were all 
owned by The McCourt-Broderick Limited Partnership (“TMBLP”). Los Angeles Dodgers 
LLC housed the team. LA Real Estate LLC owned Dodger Stadium. Blue Landco LLC, a 
direct subsidiary of TMBLP, owned the parking lot. Los Angeles Dodgers and LA Real 
Estate (and a number of the intervening holding companies between them and TMBLP) 
filed for bankruptcy. Blue Landco did not, nor did TMBLP. TMBLP was owned ninety 
percent by Frank H. McCourt, Jr., and ten percent by The McCourt Company, 
Incorporated. See Emergency Motion for Interim & Final Orders (i) Authorizing Debtors 
To Obtain Postpetition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, & 364, & (ii) Sched-
uling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) & 4001(C) at 3, In re L.A. 
Dodgers LLC, 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010), 2011 WL 2535793, at *3 
(discussing ownership structure). The ownership of TMBLP was further complicated by 
divorce proceedings between Frank and Jamie McCourt. Id. at 11. 
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limited liability company that owned the stadium another, and the lim-
ited liability company that owned the parking lot stayed out of bank-
ruptcy entirely.7 While overseeing the team’s bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
judge had no power over the investors in the stadium. When making de-
cisions in the bankruptcy of the stadium entity, the judge was bound to 
maximize the value of the stadium, not the joint value of the stadium and 
the team together.8 The parking lot was never in bankruptcy, and bank-
ruptcy’s automatic stay had no effect on the rights of its investors. More-
over, the team itself was utterly dependent on its franchise rights with 
Major League Baseball.9 The ability of the Dodgers to retain those fran-
chise rights was not at all clear.10 In short, the Dodgers bankruptcy was 
emphatically not a world in which all the stakeholders had to work to-
gether and no one had a right to leave the scene. 
Thus, while the standard account of bankruptcy focuses on protect-
ing economic enterprises,11 or what many would call “Coasean firms,”12 
and equates that enterprise with the debtor that files the bankruptcy pe-
tition, the corporate structure of the Dodgers showed that the two are 
not always one and the same. Bankruptcy operates on legal entities, not 
                                                                                                                 
7. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order Directing Joint Administration of the Debtors’ 
Chapter 11 Cases at 1, L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010) (June 27, 2011), 2011 WL 
2678239, at *1 (identifying various debtor entities). The parking lot alone carried a debt 
of $67 million. See Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Peti-
tions & First Day Motions at 6 n.3, L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010) (June 27, 
2011) [hereinafter Declaration of Ingram] (describing debt structure of parking lot). Sev-
eral hundred million dollars’ worth of debt was in a subsidiary of the entity that owned the 
stadium. See id. at 5 (noting financing taken on by subsidiary of LA Real Estate LLC).  
8. As discussed in Part IV, judges at the margin push back against this feature of the 
law and allow the law to operate on corporate groups rather than on individual debtor 
entities when gaps in the law permit. Part of the purpose of this Article is to examine 
whether this move is a good or a bad idea. 
9. See Major League Baseball, Major League Constitution, art. IX, § 1 (2005), availa-
ble at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (providing that games will be scheduled by Commissioner and 
no Major League Club may play games without approval of Commissioner); see also id. 
art. VIII, § 4 (providing grounds for involuntary termination of rights of Major League 
Club).  
10. See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (discussing legal uncertainty 
about assumability of nonassignable contracts). 
11. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 2 (“Bankruptcy law can and should help a firm stay 
in business when it is worth more to its owners alive than dead.”). 
12. Coase famously defined the firm as coming into existence when one manager 
owns and directs the use of resources in a project. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
Economica 386, 393 (1937) (noting firm “consists of the system of relationships which 
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur”). 
Legal entities, on the other hand, are artificial boundaries that may be unrelated to eco-
nomic activity. An economic enterprise directed by a single entrepreneur can be split into 
several legal entities, or conversely, several disconnected enterprises can be brought under 
one legal umbrella. See Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, 93 Va. L. Rev. 515, 518–19 (2007) (defining differences between 
legal and economic theories of firm boundaries). 
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on firms. Investors are free to place the critical assets of the same eco-
nomic firm into whatever legal entities they want, and they frequently do. 
This feature of modern corporate structures must be part of any coher-
ent account of the law of corporate reorganizations. This Article focuses 
on an important and neglected feature of a world in which highly spe-
cialized assets of a single firm can be placed in multiple legal entities: the 
way in which it allows investors to opt out of the standard bankruptcy re-
gime.13  
In contrast to a regime of free contracting,14 existing law allows 
investors to acquire the right to opt out of bankruptcy only if they take 
particular steps that are discrete and visible. Investors must use legal enti-
ties as building blocks.15 For this reason, the existing regime possesses a 
number of conspicuous virtues that a regime of free contracting does 
not.16 Withdrawal rights in their current form, far from being incon-
sistent with a coherent law of corporate reorganizations, may be an 
affirmatively desirable part of it. Giving investors the ability to create exit 
rights, but limiting the shape they can take, may make investors as a 
group better off. 
This Article unites a number of different strands of thought in cor-
porate law and corporate reorganizations. Most obviously, it connects to 
the literature on the way corporate form allows investors to separate as-
sets from each other.17 The focus of much of this work, however, is on a 
corporate group in which the individual legal entities contain various 
stand-alone businesses, rather than a single business with assets placed in 
separate legal entities.18 Hence, this line of work examines such questions 
as spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stocks.19 This work has also explored 
                                                                                                                 
13. A conspicuous exception is an excellent paper by Ayotte and Gaon. See Kenneth 
Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of “Bankruptcy Remote-
ness,” 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1299, 1301–04 (2011) (focusing on ability of parties to put assets 
in bankruptcy-remote entities in context of securitization of accounts and other nonspe-
cialized assets). 
14. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 
107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1819 (1998) (encouraging bankruptcy regime that allows parties to 
contract for bankruptcy system of their choice to reduce costs of debt).  
15. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (noting existing law provides investors 
“building blocks” to tailor their rights). 
16. See infra Part I.A (discussing benefits of bankruptcy regime that utilizes legal 
entities as building blocks). 
17. Hansmann and Kraakman are most responsible for developing this idea. See, 
e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44 
Eur. Econ. Rev. 807, 810 (2000) (identifying and analyzing significance of asset partition-
ing through corporate form).  
18. See, e.g., Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 12, at 558–65 (examining separation of 
different economic activities into different legal entities within same corporate group). 
19. See, e.g., id. at 567–69 (discussing spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stocks). 
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bankruptcy-remote vehicles in which liquid assets such as accounts are 
placed in separate legal entities.20  
This Article also connects to the work that examines the way in 
which the law allows parties to opt out of legal rules. One needs to worry 
not merely about whether a rule is a default but also the way in which 
parties are allowed to opt out of it.21 At the same time, this Article links 
with work that focuses on the way that some legal rights, particularly 
those associated with property, tend to come in a finite number of dis-
crete forms that cannot be broken down.22  
The use of discrete and visible legal entities limits the information 
search costs for potential lenders. To assess these withdrawal rights, a 
lender need only inform itself as to the legal boundaries of the debtor. 
This information is already indispensable to a lender under any alterna-
tive system.23 Thus, the use of legal entities as building blocks allows 
investors to adopt valuable withdrawal rights that might substitute for 
costly monitoring while limiting the information costs associated with 
bankruptcy by free contract. The account this Article offers of withdrawal 
rights reconciles the apparent inconsistency between the standard ap-
proach to corporate reorganizations (which views a denial of withdrawal 
rights as essential to solving a collective action problem) with the conven-
tional story of debt (which relies on the need for creditor opt-out rights 
to discipline debtors).24  
Part I lays out the basic structure of the argument. Part II uses a sim-
plified version of the Dodgers reorganization to identify the bargaining 
dynamics that these withdrawal rights create. The costs of withdrawal 
rights are the focus of Part III. Part IV looks at how courts have treated 
withdrawal rights. At the margin, they have inclined against enforcing 
them. The Part argues that this instinct, while completely understand-
able, is likely a mistake, resting as it does on the unstated assumption 
                                                                                                                 
20. See, e.g., Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 13, at 1301–04 (discussing separate legal 
entities in context of securitization of accounts and other nonspecialized assets). 
21. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 
Yale L.J. 2032, 2036 (2012) (showing attention must be paid not merely to default rules 
but also to “altering rules,” the path one must follow to opt out of background regime). 
22. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 24–42 (2000) (setting out their 
theory of numerus clausus, which provides that having limited set of known, available op-
tions or building blocks establishes optimal balance between parties’ frustration costs and 
third-party monitoring costs). 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 49–50 (explaining it is easy for investors to dis-
cover separate legal entities). 
24. Barry Adler discusses this inconsistency in depth and—accepting it as unrecon-
ciled in the current system—proposes a novel solution mechanism. See Barry E. Adler, 
Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. Legal Stud. 209, 212 (2012) (suggesting 
debtors with junior interests would propose take-it-or-leave-it reorganization plan that 
would have debtor retain collateral and include sale of debtor’s assets). This Article sug-
gests that the existing regime may already provide a solution to the problem.  
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that, wherever possible, bankruptcy law works best if it operates on the 
economic firm as a whole, rather than on the separate legal entities that 
constitute it.  
The last Part of this Article examines—through a withdrawal-rights 
lens—other devices stakeholders use to control a critical asset when the 
business enters bankruptcy. An investor in a manufacturer, for example, 
may own tooling critical to a plant’s operation.25 An investor in a restau-
rant can own the building and lease it to the restaurateur, rather than 
taking a mortgage on it. A sports league might control a professional 
team’s ability to play other teams. The way in which existing law treats 
these withdrawal rights is suspect, as it focuses on issues (such as whether 
a transaction is a “true bailment”) that are largely orthogonal to the chal-
lenge at hand,26 which is ensuring that they serve to discipline the debtor 
before the fact without imposing excessive bargaining costs after the fact. 
I. WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS, ENTITY PARTITIONING, AND BANKRUPTCY 
TAILORING 
There are, of course, a number of reasons to place assets in different 
corporate entities.27 This Article focuses on how such partitioning can 
                                                                                                                 
25. See infra Part V.A (analyzing relationship between Chrysler and Plastech, where 
Chrysler owned tooling that was located and used at Plastech plant). 
26. See infra Part V (discussing how law deals with various withdrawal rights, such as 
leases, bailments, and nonassignable contracts). 
27. A firm might attempt to isolate the business as a whole from the tort liabilities of 
one of its divisions. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (ac-
knowledging some entities within corporate group exist to limit liability concerns with 
respect to asbestos); Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 450 
B.R. 432, 437–38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (detailing how company separated oil and gas 
assets from rest of company holdings to reduce liability for acquisition of bulk of com-
pany). 
Sometimes it may make sense to put highly liquid assets that require little manage-
ment and are more or less subject to exogenous risks, such as accounts receivable, into a 
separate legal entity. Those who invest in this entity can look to these assets without having 
a stake in the rest of the business. See Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 12, at 568–69 
(highlighting greater transparency and ease of asset valuation as benefits of separate legal 
entities). Corporate groups can also arise when a large business has several different divi-
sions. Each division might be a stand-alone business that is best served with a different 
capital structure. One might be highly regulated and enjoy stable returns, while the other 
may be a high-technology company with highly variable returns. The optimal leverage 
ratios for the two may be radically different. Everyone may be better off by placing each 
division into a separate legal entity. See id. at 552–53 (showing inefficiency arises when 
assets with different risk profiles are combined in one legal entity).  
These alternative explanations for the use of multiple legal entities within the same 
economic enterprise are not exhaustive. The tax consequences of every corporate struc-
ture, of course, must be taken into account. In addition, Richard Squire suggests that 
debtor opportunism may sometimes be at work in the structure of corporate groups where 
different subsidiaries are guaranteeing the debts of others. Richard Squire, Strategic Lia-
bility in the Corporate Group, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 605, 622–43 (2011). Other factors may be 
at work as well. 
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give individual investors the ability to withdraw assets from a business that 
encounters financial distress, notwithstanding bankruptcy law. 
The standard justification for forcing all investors to participate in 
the bankruptcy process and not allowing anyone to exit focuses on the 
costs that arise when everyone acts unilaterally. A valuable business can 
be torn apart when investors act in their individual interests but contrary 
to the interests of creditors as a group.28 Withdrawal rights, however, can 
bring substantial benefits when their exercise is limited. This Part focuses 
first on these benefits and then on how the ability to place assets in dis-
crete legal entities allows these benefits to be captured. 
A. The Benefits of Withdrawal Rights 
Consider a firm that has multiple assets, each of which is essential to 
the business continuing as a going concern. Assume that an investor has 
the right to withdraw a critical asset, such as a sports franchise’s stadium, 
in the event of default, notwithstanding bankruptcy law. The exercise of 
this right will shut down the firm.  
The existence of this withdrawal right is costly only if it is actually 
exercised and the firm has value as a going concern. When a single inves-
tor possesses this right, however, there is no collective action problem. 
This is not a situation in which many disparate investors will find it in 
their individual interests to seize assets even when it is contrary to the 
interests of the group. If the investor who holds the withdrawal right and 
the managers of the firm are equally well informed about the value of the 
franchise, and if they can bargain with each other costlessly, the investor 
and the managers will strike a bargain in which the firm remains intact if 
and only if the firm is worth keeping intact as a going concern. If the 
franchise has no value as a going concern, the withdrawal right will be 
exercised and the firm will be shut down.  
Far from destroying value, giving the investor the withdrawal right 
ensures that assets are quickly put to their best use. If one is confident 
that the risk of bargaining failure is small, the withdrawal right provides 
an acid test of whether the firm should be saved. A bankruptcy judge will 
likely reach the same conclusion, but only more slowly and at greater 
cost.29 It might be in the interests of parties before the fact to give an 
                                                                                                                 
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy and collective ac-
tion problem). 
29. Morrison conjectures that bankruptcy judges shut down firms in the same fashion 
as a rational decisionmaker subject to the same constraints and provides empirical sup-
port. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Con-
tinuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & Econ. 381, 411 (2007) (refuting 
conventional wisdom that bankruptcy judges delay resolution because of continuation 
bias); see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to the Critics, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 603, 627–30 (2009) (providing further empiri-
cal evidence of Morrison’s conjecture).  
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investor a withdrawal right, to provide a mechanism for shutting the firm 
down quickly when it turns out not to be worth saving.30 If the number of 
investors who possess withdrawal rights is limited, they avoid the collec-
tive action problem that arises when multiple investors have withdrawal 
rights, as well as the costs that come with a drawn-out bankruptcy process 
and the uncertainties associated with judicial valuation.31 
Withdrawal rights also give a creditor a way to ensure that the firm’s 
managers act in the creditor’s interest when the creditor cannot monitor 
them effectively. A key feature of a sensibly crafted withdrawal right is 
that it is state-contingent. The withdrawal right lies dormant in good 
states of the world. The investor can withdraw from the enterprise only 
when the loan is in default, and the agreement is written such that de-
fault occurs if and only if things are going poorly. Knowing that the in-
vestor has a withdrawal right only in bad states of the world, the debtor 
will have an incentive to prevent these states from arising. Knowing the 
debtor possesses this incentive, the investor will not have to monitor the 
debtor’s behavior as much.32 The debtor’s ability to give an individual 
investor the right to withdraw a critical asset has the same virtue that is 
commonly associated with the ability to give a hostage.33  
Taking a hostage—acquiring the right to take the stadium away from 
the sports franchise—substitutes for costly monitoring of human capi-
                                                                                                                 
30. As Adler explains, the right of cramdown may allow the threat of inefficient 
continuation and the extraction of concessions in light of that threat. Adler, supra note 
24, at 209–10; see also infra note 40 (defining “cramdown”). By providing a market test, 
withdrawal rights prevent these outcomes. 
31. See Adler, supra note 24, at 216–17 (discussing costs of unfettered withdrawal 
rights); id. at 213–15 (discussing costs of judicial valuation error). 
32. For an analysis of how debt brings with it the benefits of state-contingent rights, 
see generally Jaime F. Zender, Optimal Financial Instruments, 46 J. Fin. 1645 (1991) 
(modeling how “state-contingent transfer of control relaxes an incentive constraint that 
would bind if bankruptcy were not allowed, enhancing the value of the firm as a going 
concern”). Patrick Bolton develops this idea in several important papers in the early 1990s. 
See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 490 (1992) (contending withdrawal rights in debt 
agreements can be used to allow creditors to induce profitable behavior); Patrick Bolton & 
David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. Pol. 
Econ. 1, 5–8 (1996) (modeling effects of state-contingent control and showing that bor-
rowing from many creditors lowers payoff of strategic default by managers).  
33. The hostage is a commitment mechanism. By giving value that can be destroyed 
by another in certain states, the debtor provides a valuable and credible commitment to 
act in a certain way. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 
Colum. L. Rev. 901, 927–28 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory] (“When moni-
toring costs, such as direct supervision, are high relative to actions by the debtor that reas-
sure the creditor, both parties will agree ex ante to substitute cost-effective bonding alter-
natives.”); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Sup-
port Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 522 (1983) (offering general discussion of how 
parties can use hostages to advance their mutual interests). 
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tal.34 The investors with rights to these assets no longer need to pay as 
much attention to the way the team is managed.35 In the event of default, 
investors will use their right to withdraw the stadium as negotiation lever-
age. The credible threat of withdrawal will force the debtor to negotiate 
with them anew. The withdrawal right matters because, even though the 
stadium is never actually withdrawn, the ability to withdraw gives the in-
vestor leverage whenever there is a default. This leverage allows the inves-
tor to capture a share of the firm’s value as a going concern. This pro-
spect gives the managers a strong incentive to avoid default, just as 
someone who gives a hostage is less inclined to misbehave. The managers 
want to avoid sharing a large part of the value of the firm with someone 
else. Even if no one is looking over their shoulders, the managers will be 
less likely to divert assets to themselves (such as by hosting lavish events 
for themselves with the team’s resources) and more attentive to ensuring 
the success of the team (such as by firing bad coaches and hiring better 
players).  
A withdrawal right, like the ability to hold a hostage, is more valu-
able to some investors than others.36 Those who are well positioned to 
monitor do not need a withdrawal right. They can put covenants in their 
contracts that give them control over the levers of corporate governance. 
They can use these covenants to curb misbehavior.37 But these investors 
may protect their own position to the disadvantage of other investors and 
to the disadvantage of the investors as a group.38 These other investors 
can counterbalance this power by acquiring withdrawal rights. 
                                                                                                                 
34. When the key asset is worth comparatively little elsewhere, the ability of the inves-
tor to liquidate it is not what is driving the bargaining dynamic. Instead, what matters is 
that the firm has value only if the “hostage” is returned. It is in the mutual interest of the 
investor on the one hand and the managers (and the other investors) on the other to pre-
serve that value. The potential loss of value to the firm drives the bargaining after the fact 
and instills the discipline beforehand. What matters is not how puny the prince is, but 
rather that the kingdom is worthless without him. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the 
Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 733 (1989) (suggesting 
greater potential loss in value in losing “hostage” leads to greater effectiveness in advanc-
ing cooperation). 
35. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 32, at 490–91 (explaining state-contingent 
rights can create incentives that substitute for other control mechanisms as optimal gov-
ernance structures). 
36. See Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 33, at 932–33 (summarizing characteris-
tics that create value for hostage function of secured credit).  
37. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever 
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1211–13 (2006) (describing mecha-
nisms for creditor control in and out of bankruptcy); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, 
Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. Fin. 1657, 1667, 
1690–91 (2009) (showing how covenants allow control rights to shift as firms encounter 
financial distress). 
38. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in 
Chapter 11, 1 J. Legal Analysis 511, 538–39 (2009) (finding evidence of creditor control 
leading to inefficient sales in bankruptcy). 
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Binding the managers to good behavior not only makes the investor 
better off, but it also improves the value of the overall enterprise. The 
increase in the value of the business may more than offset the costs from 
the risk of bargaining failure.39 Withdrawal rights make the most sense 
when there are hard-to-monitor assets and a greater need to discipline 
managers. These are the cases where one of the key investors may be 
more likely to opt out of traditional bankruptcy. In these cases, the risk of 
default should be primarily in the hands of the managers.  
On the flip side, the more likely exogenous financial cycles are to 
cause default, the more parties will find it in their interest to subject in-
vestors to the “cramdown” power.40 There is no point in risking bargain-
ing failure to create withdrawal rights when external events are the likely 
cause of any default.41 Finally, of course, withdrawal rights only substitute 
for monitoring when the withdrawal has the potential to destroy value—
that is, when the partitioned asset is actually tied to the going-concern 
value of the enterprise as a whole.42 
B. Bankruptcy Tailoring 
The benefits of withdrawal rights set out above must be balanced 
against the costs they bring. If multiple investors possess withdrawal 
rights, the risk of bargaining failure rises, and they face the collective-
action problem that bankruptcy is intended to solve.43 Similarly, the 
benefits of withdrawal rights are lost if they are invisible to other inves-
tors. The familiar arguments against a regime of free contracting rest on 
both of these costs. If everyone is able to contract for a withdrawal right 
and no one has the ability to tell whether anyone else has the right, each 
investor assumes the worst.44 A “menu approach” to bankruptcy45 may 
avoid these difficulties, but does not allow structures that are tuned to 
                                                                                                                 
39. See Adler, supra note 24, at 217 (discussing bargaining failure and negotiation 
costs); see also infra Part III.B (discussing risk of bargaining failure among investors with 
withdrawal right). 
40. “Cramdown” is the power to impose a plan of reorganization over the objections 
of some creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006); see also Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever 
Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
133, 134 (1979) (defining cramdown as what happens when reorganization plan is con-
firmed over dissent of some creditors, including those with secured interests). 
41. See Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 32, at 14 (suggesting when default risk is 
high, one creditor will result in higher liquidation value).  
42. When this is not true, the cost and benefit of the withdrawal right is zero. In these 
cases, other motivations to explain entity partitioning should be considered.  
43. See infra Part III (discussing costs associated with withdrawal rights); see also su-
pra note 2 and accompanying text (noting collective action problem). 
44. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53–54 (1992) (setting forth approach where firms publicly 
select one bankruptcy regime from menu of several options). 
45. See id. (discussing “menu approach”). 
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the needs of individual investors. It does not cleanly distinguish between 
investors who can monitor effectively and those who cannot. 
The ability to craft withdrawal rights by putting assets of the same 
business in different legal entities largely overcomes these difficulties. 
Legal entities provide a way for some investors to enjoy withdrawal rights 
without creating a collective action problem or imposing hidden costs on 
others. This use of legal entities and structure to transform the rights of 
investors during bankruptcy is what this Article refers to as bankruptcy 
tailoring.  
From this perspective, existing reorganization law provides investors 
with a set of building blocks. The ability to opt out comes from the ability 
to put together these building blocks in different ways.46 Investors cannot 
opt out of bankruptcy altogether, but the collective set of investors’ rights 
can be tailored. Investors acquire the right to withdraw only through dis-
crete changes to the corporate structure. It is not the equivalent of a 
bankruptcy-by-contract regime in which investors can craft any with-
drawal right they please in the bargain they strike with their debtor.47 
Nor is it a menu approach to bankruptcy. Far from being a limited num-
ber of choices, there are many different ways of putting these building 
blocks together, as the Dodgers bankruptcy illustrates.48  
                                                                                                                 
46. While the use of different legal entities in the same corporate group is the most 
important way of allowing individual investors to opt out, it is not the only one. Part V of 
this Article examines other devices. 
47. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1819 (laying out system of free contracting to al-
low investors and debtors to opt in to chosen bankruptcy system).  
48. Of course, other reasons for creating this structure may also be at work in cases 
like the Dodgers’. Partitioning specialized assets into separate legal entities is a way to es-
tablish priority among investors. An investor in a sports franchise might want to be able to 
look to the stadium as collateral for its loan, but creating a security interest in a stadium is 
not easy. The stadium, independent of the team, produces a number of different revenue 
streams (e.g., concessions, sky boxes, and advertising). An investor who wants to protect 
itself by obtaining priority with respect to all these assets can do so, but it requires a variety 
of security interests. It is easier to segregate the assets for priority purposes by placing the 
assets in a separate subsidiary. By lending to the subsidiary, the investor obtains structural 
priority over any investors in the parent. Creating structural priority in this fashion may 
make it easier to securitize part of the revenue stream. See Iacobucci & Triantis, supra 
note 12, at 567–68 (discussing securitization and asset partitioning). 
Major League Baseball itself has rules that drive franchises toward particular capital 
structures. This was evident in In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, where limits on the debt 
load that the League permitted the team to carry drove the capital structure and much of 
the dynamics of the bankruptcy. 434 B.R 393, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (noting limit-
ing effects of debtors’ prepetition agreements with Major League Baseball respecting fi-
nancing); see also 2012–2016 Basic Agreement Between Major League Clubs and Major 
League Baseball Players Association 208 (Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://mlb.mlb.
com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (setting forth Debt 
Servicing Rule). 
Of course, many of the standard explanations for asset partitioning are not at work 
here. For example, shielding assets from tort liability was not the motivation for putting 
the team, the stadium, and the parking lot in separate legal entities. The tort risks that 
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Requiring investors to use discrete corporate entities as building 
blocks makes the withdrawal right readily visible to other investors. Sepa-
rate legal entities are relatively easy to discover. A public filing of some 
kind is needed for each one. An investor cannot obtain an exit right and 
expect to keep it secret. The partition is visible in a way that an ordinary 
contract between the debtor and an investor is not. Indeed, a transfer to 
a separate legal entity is equivalent to a sale of the asset to a third party. 
That sale alters the ownership of the asset, and that property right can be 
verified more easily than the myriad contractual rights that might exist in 
the asset. And, of course, verification of ownership is a common and 
necessary practice under any bankruptcy regime.49  
Entity partitioning allows a lender to focus on where the entity ends 
to understand its exit rights and the rights that might be asserted against 
it. Put another way, the lender on one asset may focus less on the rights 
of particular lenders in other assets. This is a major benefit of tailored 
bankruptcy over bankruptcy by contract.50 Moreover, the existence of the 
withdrawal right reduces the need for the lender to inform itself on the 
management and the capital structure of the enterprise. The investor’s 
exit right aligns incentives in a way that substitutes for that information 
gathering and subsequent monitoring. In contrast, bankruptcy by free 
design (without building blocks) requires investors to do much deeper 
investigations of the contractual capital structures of all assets in the en-
terprise.  
Withdrawal rights, of course, impose costs on other lenders. They 
must understand how all the assets fit together and what priority and 
withdrawal rights others might have in those assets. Ideally, debtors 
(driven by capital markets) will offer investors withdrawal rights only if 
their benefits exceed the costs they impose on everyone else. Critical to 
such a regime is the way in which bargaining plays out. It must give the 
debtor the right set of incentives while at the same time ensuring that 
assets are still put to their best use. The next two Parts of this Article turn 
to these dynamics. 
                                                                                                                 
render a sports franchise insolvent are remote and in any event easily insured against. 
More to the point, as the management and control of both the parking lot and the sta-
dium lie with the team, it is exceedingly unlikely tort liability could arise from either with-
out the team itself also being independently liable. 
49. See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 
J. Legal Stud. 53, 55–58 (1983) (exploring relative importance, costs, and nuances of cred-
itor’s attempts to verify ownership).  
50. Because bankruptcy by contract allows parties to design any set of bankruptcy 
rules, it might also be thought of as bankruptcy by free design. See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text (explaining bankruptcy by free design). 
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II. BARGAINING AFTER THE FALL 
Consider the following hypothetical. Entrepreneur wants to establish 
a sports franchise. To create it, Entrepreneur must spend $7 on human 
capital and intangible assets. Entrepreneur must also acquire Stadium, 
which costs $3. Once Team is formed and Stadium is acquired, the sports 
franchise will generate an expected revenue stream of $10. Without the 
ability to use Stadium, Team is worthless. Team has nowhere else to play, 
and Entrepreneur has no ability to build another stadium in a timely 
fashion and still keep Team together. Entrepreneur has $4. Hence, to 
start Team, Entrepreneur must find outside investors.51 Bank and 
HedgeFund are each willing to put up $3. Bank is able to monitor 
Team’s ongoing operations closely and is confident it can protect its in-
terests without having the ability to reach hard assets.52 By contrast, 
HedgeFund has no particular ability to oversee Team. It wants to have 
the ability to reach Stadium in the event of default.53 
To give HedgeFund a priority right to Stadium, there are two pos-
sible structures. Entrepreneur can create TeamCorp. TeamCorp can 
borrow $3 from HedgeFund and grant HedgeFund a security interest in 
the Stadium. It can then borrow $3 from Bank and give Bank a security 
interest in everything else.54 Alternatively, Entrepreneur can create 
TeamCorp and have TeamCorp create StadiumCo as a wholly owned 
subsidiary. StadiumCo can borrow $3 from HedgeFund on a secured ba-
sis. TeamCorp can also borrow the same amount from Bank and grant 
Bank a security interest in TeamCorp’s own assets, including TeamCorp’s 
equity stake in StadiumCo. StadiumCo can then use its funds to build 
Stadium and enter a related-party lease allowing TeamCorp full use and 
control of the asset. The lease will set the payment obligations from 
TeamCorp to StadiumCo in an amount sufficient to service the debt.  
                                                                                                                 
51. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 32, at 475–79 (developing model of financial 
contracting based on need of entrepreneur to obtain outside funding).  
52. The assumption that Bank is better positioned to monitor is not essential. When 
there are two investors, neither with any special monitoring ability, it may still make sense 
for one of them to have a priority right that is tied to a particular asset. The one without 
the right receives a higher rate of interest and a lower return in bad states, but both credi-
tors benefit from having a debtor who is less likely to misbehave. See Randal C. Picker, 
Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645, 658 (1992) 
(analyzing positive externalities of creditor monitoring). 
53. At this level of abstraction, the standard account of secured credit developed in 
the early 1980s explains the capital structure of Team and the allocation of assets to Bank 
and HedgeFund. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corpo-
rate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49, 56 (1982) (developing now conventional account of secured 
creditor as monitor).  
54. In this first structure, HedgeFund would have a deficiency claim against 
TeamCorp in the event that Stadium was not worth enough to pay HedgeFund in full. 
Nothing of moment turns on this. Bank is the only other creditor and will exhaust all the 
other assets in the event that TeamCorp proves insolvent.  
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The differences in these structures matter only in bad states of the 
world. Let us imagine therefore that things go poorly, and Team’s for-
tunes decline. If Team were shut down, Stadium would fetch only $2 and 
no other assets could fetch anything. When Team encounters financial 
distress, Bank is able to exercise control. It can either displace or make 
common cause with Entrepreneur. But Team does not engage in any 
workout with HedgeFund, and Team defaults on its obligations to 
HedgeFund.  
This Article focuses only on how the withdrawal right will affect the 
investors when Team is worth more than Stadium and there is no doubt 
that the firm as a whole is worth saving. Here the withdrawal right, if ex-
ercised, would destroy value.55 But if the investors create the right only 
when the risk of bargaining failure is low, the right will rarely be exer-
cised. It changes only the way the bargain is struck among the different 
parties.56 
A. Bargaining Without Bankruptcy 
Let us assume that the enterprise altogether is worth $6 and Stadium 
alone is still worth $2. The synergy of keeping these assets together is 
worth $4. It is the difference between the value of keeping the assets to-
gether with the human capital ($6) and the liquidation value of the hard 
assets ($2). In the absence of bankruptcy, the default gives HedgeFund 
the ability to sell Stadium to someone else for $2. With this power in 
hand, it can enter into negotiations with Entrepreneur. Because the 
highest-valued use of Stadium is with Team, one would expect 
HedgeFund and Entrepreneur to negotiate and reach a deal of some 
kind.  
                                                                                                                 
55. Of course, when exercising the withdrawal right increases value by putting assets 
to better use, it is easy to justify. 
56. The way that the right to withdraw assets affects bargaining has been well ex-
plored. See, e.g., Christopher Avery & Peter B. Zemsky, Money Burning and Multiple 
Equilibria in Bargaining, 7 Games & Econ. Behav. 154, 155 (1991) (modeling potential 
equlibria that arise when “at least one player has the ability to take some action that re-
duces the value of the asset after her own offer is rejected”); Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. 
Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. 
Legal Stud. 311, 328–40 (1991) [hereinafter Baird & Picker, Bargaining Model] (model-
ing general bargaining dynamics of rights in bankruptcy between debtor’s manager and 
senior creditors); Alberto Dalmazzo, Outside Options in a Bargaining Model with Decay in 
the Size of the Cake, 40 Econ. Letters 417, 418–21 (1992) (modeling effect of cake shrink-
ing faster than outside options on bargaining); Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Involuntary 
Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 52 Econometrica 1351, 
1352 (1984) (modeling how “allow[ing] agents to freely revise their plans at each instant” 
will affect what type of agreement parties enter); John Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargain-
ing Theory: An Introduction, 53 Rev. Econ. Stud. 709, 709–10 (1986) [hereinafter Sutton, 
Non-Cooperative Bargaining] (comparing effect of choosing noncooperative bargaining 
model against traditional bargaining model on bargaining outcome).  
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The simplest way to model the bargaining problem is to assume that 
HedgeFund is able to start the negotiations. It proposes a share of Team 
that it will accept. Entrepreneur (acting on its own behalf and Bank’s) 
can accept the offer or make a counteroffer. On hearing a counteroffer, 
HedgeFund can again either sell Stadium to a third party or make a 
counteroffer itself. Suppose also that it costs them nothing to make of-
fers, but delay is equally costly to each. The value of Team and value of 
Stadium to any third party are reduced the longer the negotiations take. 
Under these conditions, as the periods between rounds become arbi-
trarily short, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which 
HedgeFund will propose to keep an amount arbitrarily close to half the 
value of Team (or $3) at the outset and Entrepreneur will accept.57 The 
equilibrium of $3 assumes uniform discount factors across parties and 
assets. With different assumptions, the numbers change, but the outcome 
is consistent: HedgeFund is able to capture part of the value of the firm 
over and above the value of Stadium.58 
                                                                                                                 
57. This is a standard Rubinstein bargaining model. See generally Ariel Rubinstein, 
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 Econometrica 97 (1982). For an applica-
tion of such a model in bankruptcy renegotiations, see Baird & Picker, Bargaining Model, 
supra note 56, at 312. This Article’s model assumes that the bilateral negotiations are be-
tween the investor with the withdrawal right and those currently in control of the debtor, 
which in the typical case will include a creditor with control rights like Bank. 
Baird and Picker’s model focuses on HedgeFund’s ability to exit. See id. at 329 
(modeling bargaining problem as “two-person noncooperative game of altering offers with 
exit options”). What matters for the purposes of this Article, however, is not primarily 
HedgeFund’s ability to exit, but rather Entrepreneur’s inability to cramdown HedgeFund 
outside of bankruptcy. This Article refers to HedgeFund’s ability to exit and its ability to 
resist cramdown collectively as its “withdrawal right.”  
58. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that the value of Team decays faster 
than the value of Stadium. If Team cannot get its financial house in order, it may quickly 
lose all its value. Stadium, however, will remain available for concerts regardless of what 
happens to Team. All that is lost is a few concert dates. Unlike Team, it is not a melting ice 
cube. In the limiting case in which the liquidation value of Stadium does not decay at all, 
HedgeFund always gets the value of Stadium and bargains with Entrepreneur (who works 
in concert with Bank) over the value of the franchise over and above the value of Stadium 
as a concert venue. This difference is the relevant pie, and the natural dynamics of bar-
gaining will lead them to split it. With that assumption, the bargained-for share here would 
be $4 ($2 for Stadium plus $2 as half of the remainder). The intuition is that the nonde-
caying exit option is not up for grabs. It is like money in your pocket. This equilibrium is 
shown in Dalmazzo, supra note 56, at 419.  
If it is assumed alternatively that the value of the exit option decays at the same rate as 
the value of Team, the ability to liquidate puts a floor on the bargaining game. Team and 
HedgeFund are dividing the value of TeamCorp between them. HedgeFund will never 
take less than the liquidation value of its collateral, but its threat to demand more is not 
credible. This is Baird and Picker’s assumption. Baird & Picker, Bargaining Model, supra 
note 56, at 333. Baird and Picker did not consider the possibility that the value of the exit 
option decays at a different rate. But regardless of the outcome of any particular bargain, 
putting Stadium into a separate legal entity allows HedgeFund to capture a part of the 
going-concern value that would otherwise be divided between Entrepreneur and Bank. 
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B. Bargaining in Bankruptcy Without Entity Partitioning 
When the initial deal is structured as a secured loan from 
HedgeFund to TeamCorp and TeamCorp files for bankruptcy, the out-
come is completely different. Once the bankruptcy petition is filed, the 
automatic stay prevents HedgeFund from selling Stadium. In bankruptcy, 
Entrepreneur can propose a plan of reorganization that gives 
HedgeFund a share of Team that is worth the value of its collateral. The 
standard law-and-economics assumption is that the value should be the 
amount that HedgeFund would have received if it had exercised its non-
bankruptcy foreclosure right,59 but regardless of the yardstick one uses, 
the amount HedgeFund receives is tied to the value of Stadium, not 
Team as a whole. HedgeFund can argue that it is entitled to a share of 
the going-concern surplus, the synergy created by combining the other 
assets with Stadium, but this argument is hard to make. Even if it could 
be measured with precision, there is no metric by which to divide the 
going-concern surplus among multiple claimants.  
What matters is that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes “cramdown.”60 
Even if HedgeFund opposes the plan of reorganization, Entrepreneur 
can force HedgeFund to accept a share of the reorganized firm and can-
cel its security interest as long as one impaired creditor (in this case 
Bank) accepts the plan.61 Even if HedgeFund is fully secured, the struc-
ture of the payment terms can be completely transformed. The value of 
this share need only equal the value of the asset in which it holds a secu-
rity interest.62 
C. Bargaining in Bankruptcy with Entity Partitioning 
If the separateness of legal entities is meticulously respected in 
bankruptcy, a different result arises if the transaction is structured as a 
loan from HedgeFund to StadiumCo, and Entrepreneur places 
TeamCorp in bankruptcy. Because Stadium is housed in StadiumCo, 
TeamCorp can use Stadium only if it can cure past defaults and honor all 
the terms of the lease between StadiumCo and TeamCorp going forward, 
as shown below. The lease requires TeamCorp to pay StadiumCo $3, an 
                                                                                                                 
59. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the 
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738, 782 (1988) (defending 
liquidation value as creditor’s entitlement). 
60. See supra note 40 (defining “cramdown”). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006). 
62. More precisely, HedgeFund is entitled to retain its lien on Stadium and a stream 
of cash payments equal in value to its lien or their “indubitable equivalent.” Id. 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). The circumstances under which Entrepreneur can avoid providing a lien 
are contested. See Anthony Sexton, Indubitably Uncertain: Philadelphia Newspapers and the 
Role of Valuation Uncertainty in Attempted Cramdown of All-Equity Plans, 28 Emory 
Bankr. Dev. J. 55, 73–79 (2011) (exploring courts’ uncertainty in application of “indubita-
ble equivalent” standard and arguments for different approaches). 
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amount sufficient to repay the loan from HedgeFund in full. The lease 
obligations are geared to the amount HedgeFund is owed, not to the 
value of Team or Stadium. Corporate formalities are strictly observed, 
but StadiumCo has no independent identity. The firm is still integrated 
in the Coasean sense—all assets are controlled and managed together.63 
Indeed, StadiumCo may have no operations and no employees. Its only 
activity consists of signing the lease.  
Entrepreneur can try to file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of 
StadiumCo, but parties can structure things in a way that makes this 
hard.64 And even if Entrepreneur could place StadiumCo in bankruptcy 
and impose a reorganization plan over its objection, that plan is sup-
posed to maximize the value of StadiumCo, which requires it to insist 
that TeamCorp cure the defaults and assume the lease or bargain for the 
best deal that StadiumCo can get from TeamCorp.65  
Even if the value of Team and Stadium were less than $3, 
HedgeFund can still insist on being paid everything it is owed. 
HedgeFund’s withdrawal right gives it a veto over any reorganization of 
the team. While bankruptcy forces creditors of the same debtor to stay 
their hands and work together cooperatively, it does not oblige third par-
ties to deal with a debtor, even if everyone knows that a deal between 
them would be mutually beneficial. If one focuses on legal entities rather 
than the business, StadiumCo is merely a third party that is free to do 
                                                                                                                 
63. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining Coasean firm).   
64. The corporate charter of StadiumCo might provide, for example, that independ-
ent directors must sign any bankruptcy petition. HedgeFund can take steps to ensure that 
these directors never file bankruptcy petitions. See, e.g., infra notes 97–100 and 
accompanying text (discussing independent managers’ role in In re General Growth 
Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)). The parties can also create a struc-
ture such that the loan is made to a holding company that in turn owns StadiumCo and 
that HedgeFund is the only creditor of the holding company. A debtor with only one cred-
itor may not be able to file a bankruptcy petition at all and, even if it does, may not be able 
to confirm a plan that impairs the rights of that creditor without its consent. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(10) (providing that plan can only be approved “[i]f a class is impaired under 
the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, 
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider”). A court that is 
inclined to view the corporate group as the entity on which bankruptcy acts, however, 
might see matters differently. See infra Part IV.B (discussing judge’s decision in In re 
Charter Communications, 419 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), to treat sole creditor of 
affiliate entity as member of class of creditors of entire enterprise in joint plan). 
65. Again, this assumes that one adopts an approach that respects corporate form. 
Judge Gropper in General Growth explicitly rejects the idea that the bankruptcy of 
StadiumCo must focus on maximizing StadiumCo’s value when it is solvent. See 409 B.R. 
at 63 (noting decision of “whether to file a Chapter 11 petition can be based in good faith 
on consideration of the interests of the group as well as the interests of the individual 
debtor”). 
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business with TeamCorp as it wishes. Bankruptcy law leaves its exit option 
unaffected.66 
D. The Bargained-For Share 
That the amount HedgeFund receives in bargain in the last scenario 
($3) is equal to the amount lent (and the amount due under the lease 
from StadiumCo to TeamCorp) is an artifact of the numbers used. Imag-
ine instead that the original loan from HedgeFund was $4 and 
TeamCorp owes $4 under the lease. Holding all the distressed numbers 
constant (enterprise value at $6 and asset liquidation value at $2), 
HedgeFund will still receive $3. TeamCorp will not assume the lease, but 
rather will bargain with HedgeFund and reach a deal where it still pays 
$3. This amount is HedgeFund’s bargained-for share of the enterprise 
value and thus independent of the amount of the initial loan.  
If the enterprise were worth $7 and the initial loan $3 (and the lease 
obligation still $3 as well), the amount of the loan would put a ceiling on 
the ultimate payout. TeamCorp has the right to assume the obligations 
under its lease with StadiumCo and pay it according to the lease terms. 
The amount of bargaining power HedgeFund enjoys turns on these 
terms. The longer the lease and the fewer events of default, the less 
power HedgeFund will enjoy.  
HedgeFund’s bargaining power comes not merely from being able 
to insist on being paid $3, but on being paid according to the terms of 
the lease. A secured creditor in bankruptcy can be paid in any coin as 
long as it is equal to the value of its secured claim.67 By contrast, a lessor 
can insist on being paid in the coin for which it bargained. In the exam-
ple, it was assumed that TeamCorp can pay what it owes HedgeFund in 
cash. That is not likely to be the case. TeamCorp is almost certainly li-
quidity-constrained at the moment of bankruptcy. If TeamCorp cannot 
meet the obligations in the contract or if nonbankruptcy law prevents it 
from assuming the contract, it will need to bargain with HedgeFund. In 
                                                                                                                 
66. In the actual Dodgers case, things appear to have played out this way with respect 
to the parking lot. The parking lot never entered bankruptcy. See supra note 6. After reor-
ganization, the lease of the parking lot (with its $14 million annual payment) was not only 
respected in full but its term was extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years. Some 
early reports suggest that the owners of the parking lot may have negotiated for new flexi-
bility in future development rights. As a result the stakeholders in the parking lot suffered 
no loss from the reorganization. Indeed some of them may have benefited. It is notewor-
thy that, while McCourt’s ownership of the team and the stadium do not continue after 
the bankruptcy, he still owns a fifty-percent interest in the parking lot. Bill Shaikin, Park-
ing Costs: $14 Million a Year, L.A. Times, May 5, 2012, at C1. It is likely that his control 
over withdrawal rights of the parking lot played a role in the bargaining that went on with 
respect to the rest of the enterprise.  
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (requiring those holding secured claim to receive 
note for value of collateral and lien or proceeds from sale of collateral, or their “indubita-
ble equivalent”). 
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driving that bargain, HedgeFund is not limited by the amount it was 
owed under the lease. The amount it receives in the end turns on the 
debtor’s liquidity and the asset value relative to enterprise value. If the 
franchise is worth $10, the full loan payment is $3, and the asset is worth 
$2, then HedgeFund gets $3 if TeamCorp can meet the terms of the orig-
inal contract68 and $5 if it cannot.69 
III. THE COSTS OF WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS 
Withdrawal rights will inure to everyone’s benefit only if the costs 
that come with them can be contained. For its part, an investor that has a 
withdrawal right will have every incentive to exploit the right once trig-
gered. It will try to capture a part of the value of the firm as a going con-
cern. The investor will possess this incentive even when the default is 
merely a technical one that has nothing to do with any of the difficulties 
that the firm actually faces. Problems seem even more likely to arise 
when multiple investors are in the picture and a bargain must be struck 
among all of them. Ensuring that parties can bargain effectively in such 
environments is harder. This Part explores these two potential costs and 
suggests that they are smaller than they might at first appear. 
A. Limiting the Problem of Technical Default 
Because HedgeFund can exercise its withdrawal right only if things 
go badly, it has only a limited ability to use the leverage that the with-
drawal right gives it. Entrepreneur can protect itself by ensuring that the 
business has the resources needed to pay HedgeFund in full. Similarly, 
while HedgeFund may have an incentive to call a technical default just to 
get a chance to negotiate for the going concern, its ability to do so is 
quite limited. HedgeFund’s legal relationship is with StadiumCo. Its abil-
                                                                                                                 
68. To be precise, StadiumCo receives the payments under the lease. The terms of 
the deal between HedgeFund and StadiumCo will determine how much of this revenue 
HedgeFund receives.  
69. In all of these examples, Stadium’s liquidation value is less than the bargained-for 
share that HedgeFund could capture. Consider now the case in which the liquidation 
value exceeds the bargained-for share. HedgeFund lends $8 to StadiumCo, and 
StadiumCo leases Stadium to TeamCorp for $8. TeamCorp encounters financial distress. 
The business as a going concern is worth $10. Without Team, Stadium’s next best use is as 
a concert venue that will bring expected revenues of only $6. The business has a going-
concern surplus of $4, the difference between the value of the operating business and the 
liquidation value of its only asset. What will be the outcome of bargaining between 
HedgeFund and Team?  
If it is assumed, as above, that the assets have uniform discount factors, then the liq-
uidation value is a floor on the bargaining and HedgeFund demands and gets $6. If it is 
assumed the enterprise value decays while Stadium’s liquidation value does not, then 
HedgeFund takes the $6 and bargains for half the remainder and takes a total of $8. See 
supra note 58 (discussing effects that varied rates of value decay have on bargaining dy-
namic). 
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ity to declare a default on StadiumCo does not necessarily give it any 
right to interfere with TeamCorp’s ability to continue to use Stadium. All 
TeamCorp needs to do is comply with the terms of the lease.  
Entrepreneur enjoys two levels of protection. First, Entrepreneur 
takes steps to ensure that StadiumCo does not default on its obligation to 
HedgeFund in the first instance. Among other things, Entrepreneur can 
protect itself against this by avoiding or curing technical defaults (or lim-
iting the terms of default in the original agreement) or maintaining solid 
credit to allow StadiumCo to pay off or refinance the loan.  
Moreover, the parties can structure the deal to ensure that even 
when HedgeFund forecloses on Stadium because of a default of 
StadiumCo, it lacks the ability to disturb the lease with TeamCorp.70 Only 
TeamCorp’s failure to pay the rent on Stadium would terminate the 
lease. HedgeFund’s acceleration of the debt against StadiumCo will give 
it no more than a right to take over StadiumCo. It will get assets that it 
financed in the first place, and those assets will be subject to a lease with 
TeamCorp.  
In this way, legal separation actually provides added protection for 
the debtor as well as the creditor. When Stadium is an asset within 
TeamCorp with no related-party contracts or leases, a technical default 
on a security interest would require a bankruptcy to avoid giving 
HedgeFund the ability to withdraw. The existence of the separate legal 
entity, StadiumCo, can make HedgeFund’s accession to Stadium a non-
event as far as TeamCorp is concerned.71 
B. Multiple Parties and the Risk of Bargaining Failure 
The stylized facts involving TeamCorp and HedgeFund illustrate bi-
lateral bargaining. Any reorganization of a large firm will involve multi-
ple players. Modeling this bargaining is harder.72 Moreover, when many 
of the players control assets that contribute to the value of the firm as a 
                                                                                                                 
70. In other contexts, it is common for parties to use a Non-Disturbance Agreement. 
It can be part of a larger Subordination and Non-Disturbance Agreement (SNDA) that 
sets out the relationship between the lender and the lessee. The nondisturbance part of 
the agreement is a promise that the lease will remain valid even after a creditor forecloses 
on the property. The point here is not the precise mechanism parties choose, but rather 
that the trigger empowering HedgeFund to take control over the parking lot can be finely 
tuned and dramatically limit the ability of HedgeFund to hold up Entrepreneur.  
71. All that said, the higher the risk of technical default (and the more costly it is to 
contract against it), the more one would expect parties to adopt traditional security inter-
ests. Cramdown protects against this form of misbehavior by creditors where there is a 
traditional security interest. 
72. It is possible that a unique equilibrium does not exist. Without limiting assump-
tions, a Rubinstein model for multilateral bargaining does not produce one. See Vijay 
Krishna & Roberto Serrano, Multilateral Bargaining, 63 Rev. Econ. Stud. 61, 61–62 (1996) 
(reconciling Rubinstein bargaining model with multilateral bargaining); Sutton, Non-Co-
operative Bargaining, supra note 56, at 720–21 (finding certain ranges of discount factors 
do not lead to unique equilibrium). 
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going concern, there is the potential for an empty core problem.73 Many 
coalitions of investors are possible, and none of them may be stable.74 But 
even if one cannot model this process with precision, one can observe 
that the ability to tailor the extent of the bankruptcy cloak allows parties 
to exercise control over this problem. 
Firms that enter bankruptcy today are rarely in freefall. To return to 
the example, Bank and Entrepreneur will typically begin their negotia-
tions long before the petition is filed. If a negotiation with HedgeFund 
would be too costly or introduce too great a risk of bargaining failure, 
Bank can provide the financing needed to keep the lease of Stadium in 
place or allow someone else to provide it.75 There is no risk of bargaining 
failure because HedgeFund will be a spectator to the bankruptcy and 
nothing more. Altering the dynamics of an impending bankruptcy is 
costly, but the ability to alter these dynamics means that the risk of bar-
gaining failure in bankruptcy is one that can be controlled.76 
If courts respect entity partitioning, the debtor can eliminate the 
costs associated with bargaining with someone who holds withdrawal 
rights by paying that investor off. If Bank and Entrepreneur foresee a 
major risk of bargaining failure, they can jointly agree to assume the con-
tract with Stadium (and thus pay off HedgeFund). This is true even if 
Bank is a creditor of a partitioned entity itself. It may be that the major 
players agree to simplify the bargaining by financing the debtor’s as-
sumption of contracts with multiple small entities. This works especially 
well where the small players’ loans are less than their bargained-for 
share.77 By providing liquidity for the payments, Bank can increase the 
                                                                                                                 
73. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J. 648, 
688–92 (2010) (defining empty core problem as situation in which no focal point exists 
around which to form agreement). 
74. See id. at 690 n.190 (“An ‘empty core’ exists when three or more parties cannot 
reach a stable agreement with each other because some other agreement always exists that 
at least one party prefers.”). 
75. In the Dodgers bankruptcy, for example, debtor-in-possession financing was 
needed in part to make payments to parking lot and its creditors. See Declaration of 
Ingram, supra note 7, at 8–12. 
76. This strategy would resemble bargaining models where multiple parties can con-
duct sequential binding bilateral negotiations. See Suchan Chae & Jeong-Ae Yang, An N-
Person Pure Bargaining Game, 62 J. Econ. Theory 86, 87–88 (1994) (envisioning one 
player promising certain share of overall pie to others in succession in exchange for giving 
up their negotiating rights); Krishna & Serrano, supra note 72, at 62–64 (describing “exit” 
game where one player’s acceptance of proposal removes itself from negotiations, leaving 
other players to haggle); Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargaining, supra note 56, at 721–23 
(modeling negotiations between players who respond to proposals in turn, with earlier 
responders being bound unless later responders veto entire deal). The dynamics of that 
bargain is such that negotiations will reduce the risk of bargaining failure without allowing 
the debtor to selectively allocate shares of the pie. 
77. The ability to assume the contract is the key. In the terms of a bargaining model, 
it creates the ability, not usually present, to create a binding side deal. See Chen-Ying 
Huang, Multilateral Bargaining: Conditional and Unconditional Offers, 20 Econ. Theory 
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size of the pie that it is bargaining for and the other creditors get their 
full payment.78  
In this system, the opportunity for debtor misbehavior is limited. 
The entity that is “bought off” gets the amount it is owed under the con-
tract and has no ability to reject that deal. To the extent that the entity is 
losing some bargained-for share of the going concern, it is only because 
the exit option worked and ensured that it was paid in full. To be sure, 
the debtor might favor one creditor over another when no creditor’s 
bargained-for share was greater than its contract share. The potential for 
this misbehavior is limited, however. First, and most importantly, the 
debtor will likely need to have financing by the major creditors of the 
estate, and they have an incentive to curb this misbehavior. Second, bar-
gaining models suggest no benefit to the debtor from such favoritism. 
The debtor just reduces its own share of the going concern.79 There is a 
risk that management (as debtor’s agent) will try to obtain a side pay-
ment from the favored creditor,80 but any decision to assume a contract 
will go before the judge and can be challenged.81 
                                                                                                                 
401, 401–04 (2002) (modeling scenario where one player makes private unconditional 
offer to buy out another’s proposal rights that would not require other players’ consent); 
Sandeep Baliga & Roberto Serrano, Multilateral Negotiations with Private Side-Deals: A 
Multiplicity Example, 3 Econ. Bull., no. 1, 2001, at 1, 1 (approaching problem of multi-
party negotiations in context of joint and several liability). It will not make sense to buy 
out parties whose bargained-for share is less than the amount they are owed unless the 
premium for avoiding bargaining failure makes up the difference. 
78. A similar strategy appears to have been employed by Major League Baseball in 
the Dodgers bankruptcy. One of the largest fights in that bankruptcy was over whether 
Major League Baseball was to provide debtor-in-possession financing or whether the team 
could obtain it from a new lender. See In re L.A. Dodgers LLC, 457 B.R. 308, 311 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2011) (noting Major League Baseball objected to terms proposed by new lenders). 
Major League Baseball was willing to make a loan on better terms than any lender in the 
market, perhaps because the cost of providing a below-market loan was more than offset 
by the more powerful bargaining position it would enjoy without another large player on 
the scene who also possessed withdrawal rights. Only Major League Baseball could make 
this below-market offer because it was going to be part of the bargaining in every event: Its 
participation as lender simplified the bargaining dynamic in a way that no other lender’s 
participation could.  
79. See Huang, supra note 77, at 401–04 (modeling buyout of one party in three-
party bargain). 
80. Such side deals are more common when a lender seeks to confirm a plan and 
asks for the support of the existing managers and at the same time offers continued pay-
ments, whether the manager continues working for the firm or not. See, e.g., In re Bush 
Indus., Inc., 315 B.R. 292, 304–05 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting lender’s promise to 
continue paying CEO where CEO has already moved out of state and has right to quit 
after one year and continue receiving same payment for another three). 
81. See, e.g., id. at 304–07 (finding plan proposed in bad faith because, among other 
things, of promise to continue paying CEO and releasing him from various debts owed to 
firm). Also misbehavior by debtor’s management is most likely to occur when things are 
particularly bad. That is likely to correlate with a lack of liquidity. But, as noted, a lack of 
liquidity will be a limiting constraint on the ability to favor creditors here. 
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The danger that the debtor will favor some creditors over others 
looms largest when courts partially disregard the characteristics of legal 
entities. For example, a court might allow the debtor to bring some legal 
entities into a bankruptcy proceeding while leaving others out and not 
fully collapsing the corporate structure. Such an alteration of the bar-
gaining dynamics is more problematic. The choice between who is in and 
out is solely in the debtor’s hands and is not constrained by law or liquid-
ity. Priority among investors arises not out of the original bargain, but 
because of jockeying for position on the eve of bankruptcy. This Article 
returns to the issues such preferences raise in the next Part. 
IV. WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Judges are reluctant to disregard legal form entirely. They rarely 
permit substantive consolidation over the strong objection of any of the 
major players.82 Nevertheless, judges are tempted to overlook the niceties 
of corporate form and tend to treat investors in separate entities as if 
they were secured creditors of a single debtor. As shown in this Part, they 
administer the cases jointly and make decisions that in fact look to the 
value of the corporate group, rather than that of the individual entities. 
Indeed, there is a tendency among the most able bankruptcy judges, 
where ambiguities in the law permit, to treat those who invest in a com-
mon enterprise subject to common control and management as if they 
were investors of a common debtor.83 Apart from respecting the priority 
rights created by putting assets in separate corporations, the firm is 
treated as if it were a single corporate entity. Investors in each entity are 
treated as investors in the whole. This approach may give us the worst of 
both worlds. By failing to acknowledge squarely the ability to opt out that 
existing law allows, the law may lose the advantages of an opt-out regime 
without securing the advantages of a regime in which all investors are 
required to participate. 
                                                                                                                 
82. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 215 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[S]ubstantive 
consolidation should be used defensively to remedy identifiable harms, not offensively to 
achieve advantage over one group . . . .”). It should be noted, however, that substantive 
consolidation is commonplace when the major players all find it in their interest. See 
William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
237, 252 (2007) [hereinafter Widen, Corporate Form] (observing, as empirical matter, 
negotiated Chapter 11 reorganization plans frequently employ substantive consolidation); 
William H. Widen, Report to the American Bankruptcy Institute: Prevalence of Substantive 
Consolidation in Large Public Company Bankruptcies from 2000 to 2005, 16 Am. Bankr. 
Inst. L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (2008) (finding in course of larger study that majority of large public 
bankruptcy cases used substantive consolidation). 
83. The manifestation of this trend is most explicit in Judge Gropper’s opinion in 
General Growth, which is discussed at length in Part IV.A below. See In re Gen. Growth 
Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining to examine issue of good 
faith as if each debtor were independent, instead evaluating based on “interests of the 
Group as a whole”).  
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A. Withdrawal Rights and General Growth Properties 
Withdrawal rights were the central focus of the General Growth bank-
ruptcy.84 General Growth Properties was a complicated corporate group 
consisting of a parent, which was a publicly traded real estate investment 
trust, and hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliates, some wholly owned and 
others not.85 But even though made up of many legal entities, General 
Growth operated as a single enterprise. It owned or managed 200 shop-
ping centers in forty-four states in addition to several commercial office 
buildings and five master-planned communities.86 General Growth em-
ployed several thousand people to manage these assets exclusive of those 
employed at the various property sites.87 It enjoyed the economies of 
scale associated with the centralized leasing and management of these 
properties.88 National retailers were attracted with system-wide deals, and 
once brought into the fold, they were limited in their ability to misbe-
have at any one site because of potential repercussions elsewhere. 
Maintenance and construction planning were controlled centrally. In 
addition, all the cash was centrally managed.89  
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the company as a whole 
found itself in financial distress. Quite a number of the subsidiaries, 
however, remained in sound financial health. These included 
Harborplace, the premier shopping mall in Baltimore, close to its Inner 
Harbor.90 Harborplace contained a variety of stores, from a Gap and an 
Urban Outfitters to Ann Taylor and Brooks Brothers, and from a 
Sunglass Hut and Bath & Body Works to Swarovski.91 Harborplace, like a 
number of other highly successful shopping malls, enjoyed positive cash 
flows and was able to service all of its debt.92 When General Growth en-
tered bankruptcy, investors in Harborplace and other solvent subsidiaries 
sought to prevent their subsidiaries from entering bankruptcy and, once 
                                                                                                                 
84. For an account of General Growth’s corporate structure and capital structure, see 
id. at 47–53. 
85. Id. at 47. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 47–48. 
88. Id. at 48. 
89. Id. 
90. Harborplace & The Gallery, General Growth Properties, http://www.ggp.com
properties/mall-properties/harborplace-the-gallery (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
91. See Harborplace & The Gallery—Tenant Information, General Growth 
Properties, http://www.ggp.com/properties/tenant-list/harborplace-the-gallery (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
92. See Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 55 (“Debtors did not dispute that the . . . shop-
ping center business had a stable and generally positive cash flow and that it had contin-
ued to perform well, despite the current financial crisis.”). 
26 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1 
  
there, sought to prevent any of their assets from being used to finance 
the reorganization of the entity as a whole.93  
The threshold question in the case was whether the bankruptcy fil-
ing of a healthy and solvent subsidiary was in good faith when its purpose 
was to protect the health of the larger corporate group of which it is a 
part.94 This question turns on whether one can take into account the 
health of the corporate group as a whole, or whether one’s focus should 
be limited to the debtor itself. The second question turned on the extent 
to which Harborplace’s assets could be used to fund the reorganization 
of the rest of General Growth.95 The investors in Harborplace insisted 
that it was under no greater obligation to help out the rest of General 
Growth than it was to help any stranger in financial distress.96  
Harborplace’s operating agreement provided that independent 
managers had to approve any bankruptcy filing.97 The independent man-
agers were picked in a way to make it extremely unlikely that they would 
ever agree to such a filing.98 Moreover, the operating agreements or char-
ters of the various subsidiaries provided explicitly that the duty of the 
                                                                                                                 
93. See id. at 54–55 (chronicling procedural posture). 
94. See id. at 55 (noting several motions filed by lenders of subsidiaries arguing cases 
“should be dismissed because they were filed in bad faith in that there was no imminent 
threat to the financial viability of the Subject Debtors”). 
95. See id. (“Many of these parties argued that it would be a violation of the separate-
ness of the individual companies for the Debtors to upstream cash from the individual 
properties for use at the parent-level entity.”). 
96. See The Prudential Insurance Co. of America’s & Prudential Retirement 
Insurance & Annuity Co.’s: (I) Objection to the Debtors’ Motion Requesting (A) Entry of 
(i) Interim & Final Orders (a) Authorizing the Debtors’ Use of Cash Collateral & Granting 
Adequate Protection Therefore Pursuant to Sections 361 & 363 of the Bankruptcy Code & 
Bankruptcy Rule 4001, & (b) Modifying the Automatic Stay, & (ii) a Final Order Authoriz-
ing Borrowing With Priority Over Administrative Expenses & Secured by Liens on Prop-
erty of the Estates Pursuant to Section 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, & (B) Scheduling a 
Final Hearing on Each Requested Final Order & (II) Request for (A) Determination that 
Certain Debtors are Single Asset Real Estate Debtors, (B) Adequate Protection, (C) Segre-
gation & Accounting for Its Cash Collateral, (D) Entry of an Order Recognizing the Estab-
lishment of All Prerequisites for a Section 507(b) Claim, & (E) Granting Relief from the 
Automatic Stay or Dismissing Cases of Certain Debtors for Cause at 24, Gen. Growth Props., 
409 B.R. 43 (No. 09-11977) (“This would allow the Debtors to take money from the 
Prudential Borrowers to pay the debts and obligations of another Debtor.”).  
97. See Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 63 (“Article XIII (p) requires the ‘unanimous 
written consent of the Managers of the Company, including both of the Independent 
Managers’ before the SPE can take any action to file or consent to the filing, as debtor, of 
any bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
98. This mechanism failed to keep Harborplace out of bankruptcy because the 
managers of General Growth were able to take advantage of a provision in the operating 
agreement that allowed them to replace the independent managers. The managers did 
not even know they had been removed until after the bankruptcy petition was filed. Id. at 
67–68. 
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managers or directors99 was to maximize the value of the subsidiaries, not 
General Growth.100  
Allowing Harborplace to file for bankruptcy was tantamount to limit-
ing the withdrawal right for which the investors in Harborplace had bar-
gained. There was no suggestion that the investors wanted to take 
Harborplace away from General Growth. It seems Harborplace was worth 
more under General Growth’s management than under anyone else’s. 
To be sure, Harborplace is not as much a firm-specific asset as the park-
ing lot is for the Dodgers. Nevertheless, the basic dynamic is the same.101 
The thousands who work at General Growth and the systems it has put in 
place have no value without properties to manage. These systems have 
been tuned, to at least some extent, to accommodate the particular chal-
lenges of running Harborplace, with its many businesses and hundreds 
of residents. The synergy that exists between Harborplace and General 
Growth gives the investors in Harborplace the ability to extract part of 
the overall value of General Growth as a going concern. This is a power 
that they would not have if General Growth owned Harborplace outright 
and the investors merely had a security interest in it.  
The managers of General Growth make decisions that affect the 
overall welfare of both General Growth as a whole and Harborplace in 
particular. By contrast, Harborplace’s investors care about the actions of 
the managers that affect Harborplace. But those actions are difficult to 
monitor and hard to control through contract. General Growth might 
mismanage Harborplace or make changes that reduce its liquidation 
value solely for the purpose of strengthening General Growth’s expected 
payout from cramdown. And it may do so in ways that the investors in 
Harborplace cannot detect.  
General Growth adds value to the properties it controls and man-
ages because of the expertise it possesses. Monitoring the exercise of that 
expertise is hard. The monitor is unlikely to have the same expertise, and 
the decisions of management may not be observable. This problem exists 
whenever specialized human capital is a primary asset of an enterprise. 
But with their withdrawal rights, the investors in Harborplace have less 
need to observe what the managers of General Growth are doing. Even 
in bad states of the world, the managers will have an incentive to ensure 
that the Harborplace investors are paid everything to which their con-
tract entitles them, even when there is not enough to pay others.  
                                                                                                                 
99. Because many of the subsidiaries were limited liability companies, they were gov-
erned by operating agreements rather than by corporate charters or bylaws and run by 
“managers” who served a similar role to corporate directors. 
100. See Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 63–64 (explaining subsidiary operating agree-
ments provided independent managers “shall consider only” interests of subsidiary and its 
creditors in making decisions, including decision to file bankruptcy). 
101. See supra Part II (explaining bargaining dynamics). 
28 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1 
  
On the other side of the equation, there are risks of bargaining fail-
ure and opportunistic behavior by Harborplace. But these are likely to be 
small. The going-concern surplus associated with keeping Harborplace in 
General Growth derives from the economies of scale in managing a large 
number of properties at the same time. Harborplace has a relatively high 
alternate use. Moreover, the slice of General Growth’s value as a going 
concern that withdrawing Harborplace can destroy is small relative to the 
entire enterprise.102 Withdrawing Harborplace and putting it under 
other management will not shut down General Growth, but the incentive 
for General Growth to avoid overall distress will persist as its value to the 
going concern is still greater than its liquidation value and General 
Growth’s managers have an incentive to ensure that they do not have to 
bargain part of it away to the Harborplace investors.103 
The bankruptcy judge in General Growth, however, was inclined to see 
Harborplace and the other solvent entities as part of an integrated whole 
and thus to slight the withdrawal right.104 In his view, the corporate struc-
ture had the effect of giving the investors in Harborplace priority with 
respect to those assets, but it did not allow them to withdraw from the 
reorganization.105 In his approach, the judge followed conventional prac-
tice and expectations. Commentators were surprised that the devices de-
signed to keep Harborplace out of bankruptcy did not work,106 but there 
was nothing unusual in the way Harborplace was treated once it was in 
bankruptcy.  
When a corporate group files for bankruptcy, there is typically only a 
single lawyer representing the many corporate debtors and a single cred-
                                                                                                                 
102. Of course, if there is no synergy connecting General Growth and Harborplace, 
the withdrawal rights have no cost. The lack of synergy appeared to be present with an-
other property that General Growth managed, Faneuil Hall. After bringing Faneuil Hall 
into the bankruptcy, General Growth offered it for sale in 2011. According to the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority, the buyer had a “closer fit” because of its experience with “his-
toric marketplaces.” See Jenn Abelson, N.Y. Firm in Deal for Faneuil Hall Shops, Bos. 
Globe (May 10, 2011), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2011/05/10/ny_firm_
in_deal_for_faneuil_hall_shops (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing General 
Growth’s sale of Faneuil Hall lease). 
103. As Bolton and Scharfstein note, there is often a trade-off between risk of 
bargaining failure and improved ex ante incentives to avoid financial distress. See Bolton 
& Scharfstein, supra note 32, at 2 (tying manager’s incentive to strategically default to 
expected liquidation value of firm).  
104. 409 B.R. at 63 (“[A] judgment on an issue as sensitive and fact-specific as 
whether to file a Chapter 11 petition can be based in good faith on consideration of the 
interests of the group as well as the interests of the individual debtor.”). 
105. See id. at 69 (explaining creditors’ rights do not include avoiding bankruptcy 
but rather avoiding substantive consolidation that would eliminate their priority in bank-
ruptcy). 
106. See W. Rodney Clement Jr. & H. Scott Miller, General Growth: Special Purpose 
Entities (Barely) Survive First Bankruptcy Test, Prob. & Prop., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 31, 32 
(observing decision has “led some to conclude that SPEs were not quite the bankruptcy 
shield that lenders had envisioned them to be”). 
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itors committee representing the creditors of the many different corpo-
rations.107 A single plan of reorganization is proposed that provides for 
substantive consolidation of the many legal entities. More precisely, the 
plan calls for “deemed” substantive consolidation in which the entities 
are treated for purposes of reorganization as if they were collapsed. The 
plan of reorganization, however, provides for payouts to the various cred-
itor groups that respect the priority that they would have enjoyed had 
there not been substantive consolidation. Put differently, the common 
practice reinforces the basic idea that the corporate structure is merely a 
means of providing for priority among creditors.108 As long as the priority 
is respected, it does not matter whether there is substantive consolida-
tion. Under this view, nothing turns on whether business is done as a sin-
gle corporation or as a corporate group. It operates the same way, and 
the priority rights of its investors are identical. But if withdrawal rights in 
fact provide a means to curb ex ante misbehavior of managers, this ap-
proach may be mistaken.  
The most telling lesson in General Growth may lie not in the treat-
ment of the solvent entities that were brought into bankruptcy, but in 
those that were not.109 In the current regime, where courts allow separate 
legal entities to be brought along in a bankruptcy at the whim of the 
debtor, the debtor’s ability to modify the bargaining landscape is more 
problematic. A court’s disregard for the separate legal entities gives the 
debtor an option to choose which entities have withdrawal rights and 
which do not, and that choice is essentially unreviewable. There are, of 
course, many legitimate reasons to keep some entities out of bankruptcy. 
Some subsidiaries may not be wholly owned, but may rather be a joint 
venture.110 The financing of some ventures may be put at risk by a bank-
                                                                                                                 
107. General Growth was an exception to this. In part because of the differing issues 
facing the parent corporation and its subsidiaries, including the challenge that the bank-
ruptcy filings of General Growth’s subsidiaries were in bad faith, separate law firms were 
retained to focus on the different levels of the economic enterprise. See Debtors’ & Jointly 
Represented Debtors’ Response to the United States Trustee’s: (A) Objection to the Debt-
ors’ Application to Employ Kirkland & Ellis LLP as Co-Counsel for the Debtors & (B) Re-
sponse to the Debtors’ Application to Employ Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as Counsel for 
the Debtors at 5–7, Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43 (No. 09-11977) (setting forth specific 
roles to be served by law firms and noting Weil’s focus on enterprise level matters and 
Kirkland’s focus on subsidiary issues such as “the resolution of various motions to dismiss 
certain . . . [subsidiaries’] chapter 11 cases”). 
108. See Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 82, at 244, 248 & n.32 (discussing 
“deemed consolidation” and “structural priority”). 
109. 409 B.R. at 47 n.6 (noting 388 of 750 subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy). Two 
notable subsidiaries that did not file bankruptcy, Water Tower Place and Towson 
Commons, are discussed below. See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
110. General Growth relied crucially on the argument that the directors of a wholly 
owned entity have to pay attention to the group as a whole. 409 B.R. at 64–65. This does 
not apply when minority shareholders are also in the picture. 
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ruptcy filing.111 In others, the maturity of the debt may be far enough off 
that a bankruptcy filing brings no benefits.112 But the differential treat-
ment of withdrawal rights under existing law allows the debtor to direct 
the disfavored entities to file for bankruptcy but keep the favored entities 
out of bankruptcy. Indeed this may be what happened in the General 
Growth bankruptcy.  
At the time of filing, General Growth had hundreds of subsid-
iaries.113 Some had more complicated capital structures than others. 
Some were wholly owned, and some were partially owned.114 And some 
were subject to complicated litigation. General Growth—presumably in 
an attempt to simplify the bankruptcy and the bargaining—had the less 
complicated entities file bankruptcy petitions.115 The court fight revolved 
around the propriety of those filings, and the judge found them to be 
proper.116 No great thought was attached to the significance of the vari-
ous entities that did not file for bankruptcy. And the judge did not see 
any need to pull them into the bankruptcy.117  
This approach creates a world in which the investor’s withdrawal 
rights are respected if the managers choose to keep the entity that 
houses their collateral out of bankruptcy, but not otherwise. For exam-
ple, compare the fate of the creditors of Harborplace to that of creditors 
of Towson Commons. Towson Commons was a smaller mall eight miles 
                                                                                                                 
111. In contrast to an ordinary executory contract, a lender’s obligation to extend 
credit in the future cannot be assumed in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2006). 
112. When a loan is on favorable terms and is secured, the best course for the debtor 
may be to keep that loan in place. The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to do this. Id. 
§ 1124(2). But if the relevant entity has no other debt and if the covenants do not other-
wise limit the debtor, apart from its costs, bankruptcy may do no more than maintain the 
status quo. 
113. Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 47. 
114. Id. 
115. It appears that the Dodgers followed this strategy when it put the stadium entity 
into bankruptcy, but not the subsidiary holding the right to general admission ticket reve-
nues. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (discussing which entities of Dodgers 
were in bankruptcy). A bankruptcy that had to deal with hundreds of millions in securit-
ized debt and the attendant difficulties of negotiating it would be much more compli-
cated. The parties controlling the bankruptcy likely decided that this did not make sense.  
116. Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 72. 
117. One notable example was Water Tower Place. It was kept out of the bankruptcy. 
Several years before the bankruptcy filing, the minority owner of that entity had sued for 
mismanagement by the majority owner (a subsidiary of General Growth). Motion for Or-
der Pursuant to Sections 362 & 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code & Bankruptcy Rule 7065 
Enforcing or Extending the Automatic Stay or, Alternatively, Granting a Preliminary In-
junction Enjoining the Urban Litigation Pending a Determination of the Relief Requested 
in this Adversary Proceeding & Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 9–10, Gen. 
Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43 (No. 09-11977). General Growth never disclaimed Water Tower 
Place as part of the enterprise. Rather it filed a motion to stay the Water Tower litigation 
precisely because it was part of the enterprise and the litigation would complicate the re-
organization. Id. But no one in control of General Growth’s bankruptcy process ever at-
tempted to bring Water Tower into it.  
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from Harborplace and was not brought into the bankruptcy.118 Because 
Towson Commons did not file, its creditors could (and did) exercise 
their withdrawal rights by foreclosing and forcing a sale of the property 
for $28.5 million. In the end, it was those very lenders who purchased the 
property.119 Thus, while the creditors of Harborplace sat on the sidelines 
with no bargaining power, the creditors of Towson Commons exited the 
relationship with collateral in hand. We confront the odd situation in 
which the entity that is economically flourishing and successful 
(Harborplace) enters bankruptcy, while the one that is distressed does 
not (Towson Commons). 
 Very few limitations are placed on the debtor’s ability to choose be-
tween partitioned entities and their creditors. When legal entities are not 
fully respected, the debtor’s choice is largely unconstrained.120 In addi-
tion to giving the debtor the ability to prefer some investors over others, 
the differential treatment gives perverse incentives to those creditors. 
They have an incentive to create complications—such as initiating pre-
bankruptcy litigation—to make it less likely that the debtor will want to 
bring them into a reorganization. The distribution of the debtor’s assets 
again turns not on the bargain struck before the fact that was readily visi-
ble to other creditors but rather on decisions made on the eve of bank-
ruptcy.121  
B. Withdrawal Rights and Charter Communications 
Bankruptcy judges are not asked to endorse a general principle, but 
rather interpret particular provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. But 
judges’ understanding of general principles drive the outcome. This un-
derstanding led the judge in General Growth to find that the filing was in 
good faith and that the directors could and were indeed obliged to look 
                                                                                                                 
118. See Sam Eckstein, Harbor Mall Owner Files Bankruptcy Due to Debt, Johns 
Hopkins News-Letter (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.jhunewsletter.com/2009/04/29/
harbor-mall-owner-files-bankruptcy-due-to-debt-12558 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“GGP also owns Towson Commons, which has not filed for bankruptcy.”). It ap-
pears that Towson Commons may have been left out of the bankruptcy because it had 
little to add to the going-concern value of General Growth, and therefore General Growth 
was not concerned with its withdrawal. See Loni Ingraham, Decision on Towson Commons 
Auction Greeted with Optimism, Towson Times (Mar. 2, 2011), http://archives.explore
baltimorecounty. c om/news/111790/decision-towson-commons-auction-greeted-with-
optimism (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting retail space at Towson Commons 
had been “vacant for some time”). 
119. See Ingraham, supra note 118 (detailing foreclosure and auction processes for 
Towson Commons). 
120. Cf. supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (contrasting constraints on debtor 
misbehavior of favoring one creditor over another when separate legal entities are treated 
as one enterprise with constraints from when they are treated separately). 
121. Cf. supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting under bankruptcy tailoring 
approach, withdrawal rights are readily visible to investors before the fact). 
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to the interests of other members of the corporate group.122 The same 
force can be seen at work in two key judicial decisions in the reorganiza-
tion of Charter Communications. The first involved the question of how 
creditors of separate legal entities would be classified for purposes of ap-
proving the plan. The second involved the question of how the default of 
the primary debtor would affect creditors’ rights against other solvent 
affiliates. 
Charter Communications was the fourth largest cable television pro-
vider in the country.123 Under the leadership of Microsoft cofounder 
Paul Allen, it possessed an elaborate capital structure and became seri-
ously overleveraged.124 In late 2008 and early 2009, Charter found itself 
unable to meet its obligations.125 It proposed a restructuring of its debt 
that many of its creditors accepted, but some did not.126  
The first issue of interest arose because one of its most recalcitrant 
creditors was the only creditor of a legal entity in Charter’s corporate 
group.127 The reorganization plan for Charter as a whole required 
restructuring this creditor’s debt and doing this over its objection was 
difficult under existing law when it was the debtor’s sole creditor.  
Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court 
cannot confirm a plan unless at least one class of impaired claims ap-
proves the plan.128 The recalcitrant creditor argued that this was a show-
stopper. As it was the only creditor of the relevant legal entity, no plan 
could be confirmed without its consent, and its consent, it promised, 
would never be forthcoming. That its debtor was part of a larger corpo-
rate group was irrelevant.129 Nor did it matter that the legal entity was a 
holding company that was not an operating business and had no inde-
pendent existence. Bankruptcy operated on legal entities, not on 
firms.130 
The debtor insisted that the Bankruptcy Code, properly understood, 
required looking at the firm as a whole. The debtor argued that it was 
wrong to focus narrowly on a legal entity that was, by all accounts, seam-
                                                                                                                 
122. See Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 66–70. 
123. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC (In re Charter 
Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
124. Id. at 232. 
125. Id. at 233. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 266. 
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006). 
129. See Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 266 (noting creditor’s argument that section 
1129(a)(10) must be applied on per-debtor and not per-plan basis). 
130. See Redacted Objection of Law Debenture Trust Co. of New York to the Debt-
ors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code at 35–39, Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221 (No. 09-11435) (“[U]nless and until [sub-
sidiary’s] creditors . . . have been paid in full . . . no other creditors of any other entity can 
share in such distributions.”). 
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lessly folded into the large cable and broadband business.131 Because 
creditors of the larger corporate group overwhelmingly favored the plan, 
a narrow focus on a single legal entity that had one creditor was inap-
propriate. Chapter 11 was about preserving the value of the business as a 
whole, not about a holding company embedded inside of it.132 
The bankruptcy judge accepted the debtor’s argument: 
[I]t is appropriate to test compliance with section 1129(a)(10) 
on a per-plan basis, not . . . on a per-debtor basis. Here, the evi-
dence supports a finding that the business of Charter is man-
aged . . . on an integrated basis making it reasonable and ad-
ministratively convenient to propose a joint plan. That joint 
Plan has been accepted by numerous other impaired accepting 
classes, thereby satisfying the requirement of sec-
tion 1129(a)(10).133 
There is a little hand-waving here. While it may be “reasonable” and 
“convenient” to allow all investors in a firm to decide on the plan of re-
organization, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that deals explic-
itly with “joint plans” at all, let alone anything to suggest that the confir-
mation standards of a “joint plan” look to the firm as a whole rather than 
the legal entity. Treating the plans of all the legal entities as if there were 
one joint plan dampens withdrawal rights.  
Charter Communications raised a second issue about the treatment of 
legal entities in a corporate group that is reorganized under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It involved the same objecting creditor and the same 
legal entity. The debtor was obliged to pay the objecting creditor in full 
because of the absolute priority rule.134 There was, however, a dispute 
over the form that the repayment had to take. In particular, the debtor 
wanted to reimpose the terms of the original loan. (These were far more 
favorable to the debtor than what loan terms would be under existing 
market conditions.) For its part, the creditor wanted to exercise its right 
to terminate the loan and be paid its principal at the existing market 
rate. The creditor argued that the debtor had lost its right to reinstate 
the original terms of the loan because of an incurable default under the 
terms of the loan agreement.135 The loan agreement included a covenant 
that a bankruptcy petition filed by any entity related to the debtor ter-
                                                                                                                 
131. Reorganizing Debtors’ Post-Trial Brief in Support of Confirmation of the Debt-
ors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code at 85–87, Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221 (No. 09-11435). 
132. Id. 
133. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 266 (internal citations omitted).  
134. The absolute priority rule is the core bankruptcy principle that requires that all 
assets be “distributed in strict adherence to the contractual priority that exists for liquida-
tion outside bankruptcy.” Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option Preserva-
tion Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 763–65 (2011) (examining effects of 
absolute priority and suggesting potential alternative priority rule). 
135. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 243. 
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minated the loan, and there were many such entities in Charter’s corpo-
rate group.136 Once such a default has occurred, it cannot be cured,137 
and incurable defaults, if enforceable, limit a debtor’s reinstatement 
right.138  
The Bankruptcy Code says nothing explicitly about defaults linked 
to the bankruptcy filings of third parties. It does, however, refuse to en-
force defaults linked to the debtor’s own insolvency or financial ques-
tion.139 Investors as a group are better off when the Bankruptcy Code ren-
ders unenforceable clauses that automatically terminate a contract 
merely because a bankruptcy petition is filed. Defaults should be trig-
gered by events connected to the economic condition of the firm, not 
because of its need to use a collective bankruptcy proceeding to sort out 
issues among its investors.140 But none of the investors have the ability to 
monitor the debtor and prevent such “ipso facto” clauses from creeping 
into agreements. By making such clauses unenforceable, the third party’s 
withdrawal right is effective only if the debtor cannot meet its contractual 
obligations. As long as the third party is paid everything it is promised on 
exactly the same terms, it has nothing to complain about.  
But again, the twist in Charter Communications was that the clause was 
triggered by the bankruptcy of a related entity and not the legal entity 
that owed the debt. The crucial legal question was whether bankruptcy 
law enforces such clauses when they are tied, not to the debtor itself, but 
to the insolvency of related entities. The lender argued that the 
Bankruptcy Code renders unenforceable only clauses tied to the bank-
ruptcy of its own debtor, not the bankruptcy of other entities, even when 
those entities were part of the same corporate group.141  
The ability to insist on new terms is a type of exit right. It gives an in-
vestor the ability to cancel the old deal and insist on a new one. The 
court in Charter Communications, however, rejected this argument, and 
again focused on the corporate group rather than on the specific entity. 
Reasoning that “Charter is an integrated enterprise, and the financial 
                                                                                                                 
136. See id. at 236 (noting loan covenant “referencing the ability of structurally 
subordinated companies in the capital structure to pay debts as they come due”). 
137. The cross-default of payment and subsequent bankruptcy filing of a related-
entity debtor will be logically incurable—the bell cannot be unrung. More specifically, 
unless the creditors of that related-entity debtor can be paid in full immediately (unlikely 
if the related-entity debtor is insolvent), the cross-default cannot be cured. 
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (2006) (setting forth requirements for reinstatement).  
139. Id. § 365(e)(1) (“Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unex-
pired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor 
may not be terminated . . . .”).  
140. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting idea that bankruptcy proceed-
ing makes investors better off as group). 
141. See Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 250 (summarizing lender’s argument).  
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condition of one affiliate affects the others,” the court forced the lender 
to remain a lender under the original terms of its loan.142  
V. WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS AND THIRD PARTIES 
Investors possess other ways of creating withdrawal rights in addition 
to partitioning assets within a corporate group. Investors might be able to 
achieve the same outcome by slicing off a group of assets and offering 
ownership (but not control) to a third party. When the slice of assets are 
integral to the going concern of the enterprise, third-party ownership of 
the asset will provide the same withdrawal right and incentive alignment 
that HedgeFund enjoyed with respect to Team. Stakeholders can exer-
cise withdrawal rights because bankruptcy sees them as third parties ra-
ther than investors.  
Courts have typically distinguished between investors on the one 
hand and third parties on the other. The former must participate in the 
bankruptcy process, while the latter can deal with the debtor at arm’s 
length. Courts today typically see the question turning on whether some-
one is a “true lessor” or a “true bailor” rather than a secured party. In 
such inquiries, sight of the role that withdrawal rights play is usually 
lost.143 What matters should not be so much the attributes of the substan-
tive right upon which courts typically focus. Instead, the important fac-
tors are whether the investors in the enterprise as a group understand 
the nature of the right and whether the party who possesses it can exer-
cise it in a way that has the appropriate disciplining effect on the debtor 
before the fact. These are the attributes that the withdrawal right has 
when created through tailoring of the corporate form, and also the at-
tributes that make it a useful tool for investors. 
A. Withdrawal Rights, True Lessors, and True Bailors 
Third parties who own an asset can insist on being paid according to 
the contract terms, and an investor can try to opt out of bankruptcy by 
recasting itself as a third party. The trends in bankruptcy cases discussed 
throughout this Article limit the ability of parties to do this. So do spe-
                                                                                                                 
142. Id. at 251. The same judge who presided over Charter Communications reached a 
similar conclusion in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. See Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc. 
v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 420 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding bankruptcy of related entity triggered rule against ipso facto 
clause).  
143. Generally an agreement is deemed a security agreement, despite being 
characterized by the parties as a lease, if the consideration paid by the lessee is an obliga-
tion not subject to termination by the lessee and if several other conditions are met. See, 
e.g., WorldCom, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Global Asset Mgmt. Servs. (In re WorldCom, Inc.), 339 
B.R. 56, 63–75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (analyzing whether agreement is lease or security 
agreement); In re Homeplace Stores, Inc., 228 B.R. 88, 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998) (outlin-
ing framework for determining if “lease” is security agreement). 
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cific rules about how the courts treat leases.144 For example, in the sports 
franchise scenario, Team may organize itself as a single entity and sell 
Stadium to HedgeFund, which in turn leases it back to Team. If this deal 
structure were respected, HedgeFund could again largely insulate itself 
from the bankruptcy.  
But the bankruptcy court might recharacterize HedgeFund as a 
creditor with a security interest in the stadium rather than a lessor. Once 
recharacterized as a secured creditor, the lessor has no ability to insist on 
enforcing the lease according to its terms.145 In this context, courts have 
not focused on the question of when and under what circumstances a 
party should be able to enjoy a withdrawal right. Instead, they have fo-
cused more narrowly on the question of how many sticks in the 
Hohfeldian bundle146 the owner-lessor must retain in order to be a true 
lessor rather than a secured creditor.147  
In many instances, a firm will lease assets that are not highly special-
ized. In these cases, the difference between finding a transaction to be a 
lease or a secured transaction will not make much difference.148 The 
debtor will have to pay market value even if it is a secured transaction,149 
and the debtor can reject the lease if the lease obligations are above 
market.150 Regardless of whether it is a lessor or a secured creditor, the 
third party can receive no more than what the debtor would have to pay 
to acquire the same asset from someone else. There are times, however, 
when the leased asset is highly specialized. Here the characterization can 
make a big difference and the withdrawal right has the dynamic that has 
been discussed.  
One example of this can be found in the United Airlines bank-
ruptcy.151 There the parties structured the financing of the terminal at 
                                                                                                                 
144. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 618 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (finding transaction is “secured loan,” not “lease” for purpose of section 365 of 
Bankruptcy Code). 
145. Id. at 612. 
146. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 28–30 (1913) (defining property as combina-
tion of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities).  
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (providing example of how courts 
apply recharacterization test).  
148. To be sure, if the transaction is a true lease, the lessor will not face the same fil-
ing obligation that a secured creditor faces, but filing a U.C.C.-1 form is cheap, and well-
advised lessors will file one in any event. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Pos-
session and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 
187–88 (1983) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership] (noting attrib-
utes of lease or secured transaction have nothing to do with problem of “ostensible owner-
ship”). 
149. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006) (setting forth requirements that plan must 
provide for secured creditors). 
150. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (setting forth debtors’ rights to reject unexpired leases). 
151. United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005). 
2013] NO EXIT? 37 
  
San Francisco airport as a lease.152 Because the terminal is a tailored asset 
that United could not readily replace, the lessor would have been able to 
exact a share of United’s value as a going concern had it been able to 
bargain. Judge Easterbrook recharacterized the lease as a secured loan,153 
and the lessor was therefore unable to use this ability to negotiate for a 
share of the going concern. Instead, United could continue its use of the 
facilities while making a fraction of the agreed-upon payments.154 
Another example can be found in the automobile industry where it 
is common for carmakers to own their own tooling and lease them to 
their suppliers.155 Plastech Engineering was a tier-one automotive-parts 
supplier that made injected plastic products for Ford, GM, and 
Chrysler.156 It employed thousands and had annual sales of over $1 
billion.157 Much of the equipment Plastech operated was tooling specially 
designed for particular car models and so was worthless for any other 
use. Plastech encountered financial distress and could not pay its 
investors in full. It filed for bankruptcy.158 Chrysler, along with other 
automobile manufacturers, had the right to withdraw tooling from 
Plastech and turn it over to another supplier. Chrysler argued that it was 
free to exercise this right, notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing.159  
The relationship between Plastech and Chrysler is one of a sort that 
economists have been studying intensively for many decades. Vertical 
integration eliminates the tensions that arise when two different firms 
own assets that must be used in conjunction with one another.160 Hence, 
it might be expected that a car manufacturer such as Chrysler would own 
Plastech outright. Because Plastech’s assets are specific to Chrysler’s cars, 
Chrysler should be their residual owner, everything else equal.161  
But everything else is not equal. A firm such as Plastech enjoys econ-
omies of scale that allow it to make injected molding for a number of 
                                                                                                                 
152. Id. at 611. 
153. Id. at 618. 
154. Id. 
155. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (listing examples). 
156. Chrysler LLC v. Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc. (In re Plastech Engineered 
Prods., Inc.), 382 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 103–04. 
160. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986) (de-
veloping theory of ownership based on curing distortions of ex post opportunistic behav-
ior on ex ante investment by allocating ownership to one party); see also Benjamin Klein, 
Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriate Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297, 298–99 (1978) (highlighting 
relationship-specific investments as situation prone to opportunistic behavior). 
161. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 160, at 716–17 (“Integration is . . . optimal 
when one firm’s investment decision is particularly important relative to the other 
firm’s.”). 
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different manufacturers. It might become vertically integrated with 
Chrysler or Ford or GM, but it cannot vertically integrate with all of 
them. To take advantage of economies of scale, Plastech needs to enter 
into contracts with multiple manufacturers,162 and these contracts need 
to be designed in a way that minimizes the possibility that Chrysler will 
seek to take advantage of Plastech or vice versa. 
If Plastech commits its capital to tooling useful only for making parts 
for Chrysler, Chrysler might be able to take advantage of it subse-
quently.163 Contracts can minimize this hold-up threat, but they cannot 
eliminate it.164 To prevent such advantage-taking, Plastech might require 
Chrysler to finance its acquisition of the tooling. With such financing, 
Plastech is not making an enormous relationship-specific investment that 
might put it at risk of hold-up behavior by Chrysler.  
Such an arrangement, however, does not completely solve the prob-
lem. Even if Chrysler cannot hold up Plastech, Plastech may still be able 
to hold up Chrysler. The tooling is hard for others to recreate, and 
Chrysler’s own assembly line depends on a steady stream of parts from 
Plastech. A small delay from Plastech could be costly. Perhaps because of 
such risks, in the automobile industry it is common for each automobile 
manufacturer to retain ownership of the tooling its suppliers use. The 
parties capture the benefit of customized tooling, but with fewer risks of 
advantage-taking. Plastech loses the ability to threaten to shut down 
Chrysler to the extent that Chrysler has the ability to remove the tooling 
and give it to another supplier.  
By the common account,165 even this solution is imperfect. When 
there are different owners of assets that are most valuable when used to-
gether, one can minimize the hold-up problems, but one cannot elimi-
                                                                                                                 
162. The limits that economies of scale and scope can place on vertical integration 
occur in many contexts. John Morley provides an interesting analysis of this impact in the 
investment fund industry. See John Morley, The Separation of Investments and Manage-
ment 3 (Mar. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/cbl/Morley_The_Separation_of_Investments_and_Management.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that separating investment and management is 
necessary to reduce resulting liability and risk spillovers as well as to limit managerial con-
flicts of interest). 
163. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 160, at 692 (noting “contractual relationship 
between a separately owned buyer and seller will be plagued by opportunistic and ineffi-
cient behavior” where “asset specificities” exist); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 
160, at 298 (noting ways in which relationship-specific investments are prone to 
opportunistic behavior). 
164. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 160, at 325–36 (suggesting ways in 
which opportunistic behavior can be mitigated). 
165. See Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory 
of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 181, 183–85 
(2011) (summarizing incomplete contract and vertical integration literature). 
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nate them entirely.166 When Chrysler owns the tooling, it has the ability 
to withdraw the assets and use this threat to capture investments that 
Plastech has made in the relationship. Plastech may in turn underinvest 
in the relationship, such as by buying equipment that can be readily used 
to make other products. 
The dynamics explored in this Article, however, suggest that the 
hold-up costs may not be as large as commonly supposed.167 As long as 
the ability to withdraw the tooling is state-contingent, Plastech can pro-
tect itself by investing resources to ensure that this state never material-
izes.168 Moreover, these investments (such as hiring better managers and 
otherwise ensuring Plastech stays out of financial distress) may them-
selves be mutually beneficial. The withdrawal right, in other words, is suf-
ficiently tailored so that the opportunity to capture going-concern value 
produces healthy incentives. Far from being necessary evils, they may be 
beneficial.169  
From the perspective of traditional bankruptcy theory, Chrysler is as 
much an investor in the venture as someone who provided Plastech with 
the capital to buy its other equipment. Chrysler is retaining the same 
rights for which HedgeFund would bargain if it were providing the fi-
nancing for the equipment and insisted that the equipment be put in a 
separate legal entity.  
Just as the court in General Growth was inclined to treat investors in 
Harborplace as if they were secured creditors of General Growth as a 
whole,170 bankruptcy judges may be inclined to treat Chrysler in a way 
that slights its withdrawal right. Even if ultimately unwilling to recharac-
terize Chrysler’s right as a security interest or otherwise find some other 
way to deny it the ability to withdraw the equipment, the bankruptcy 
judge can delay lifting the automatic stay at the very outset of the case 
just to ponder the question for a time.171  
A delay of several months effectively deprives Chrysler of its ability to 
enjoy the benefits that come with its withdrawal right. As seen with 
HedgeFund and StadiumCo, when the highest and best use of Chrysler’s 
                                                                                                                 
166. See supra note 163 (noting hold-up problem associated with relationship-spe-
cific assets). 
167. See supra Part II.C (discussing bargaining dynamics in bankruptcy with entity 
partitioning). 
168. See supra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text (explaining state-contingent with-
drawal rights). 
169. Again, there is nothing revolutionary in this observation. The basic mechanism 
of structuring state-contingent rights to substitute for costly monitoring is well known. See 
Aghion & Bolton, supra note 32, at 486 (emphasizing that debt’s role in facilitating 
monitoring arises out of entrepreneur-investor control allocation that debt induces). 
170. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing General Growth). 
171. See Chrysler LLC v. Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc. (In re Plastech Engineered 
Prods., Inc.), 382 B.R. 90, 109 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (explaining that competing inter-
ests balancing analysis may change later, compelling different result). 
40 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1 
  
tooling is in Plastech, then the tooling will likely remain with Plastech 
regardless of whether Chrysler can exercise the withdrawal right. The 
ability to lift the stay will ordinarily affect the bargaining dynamics, not 
the ultimate outcome.172 There is, however, a risk of bargaining failure 
and the loss of going-concern value that comes with it.173 This risk is not 
trivial, but it should be appropriately discounted and weighed against the 
other costs of limiting Chrysler’s ability to assert its withdrawal right.  
This discussion focuses on the benefits that withdrawal rights bring 
even when Chrysler’s removal of the tooling would destroy the synergy 
that existed between the tooling and Plastech’s assets. Their benefits are 
even greater when everyone would be better off if Plastech were shut 
down and each carmaker bore the short-term costs of removing its tool-
ing and giving it to another supplier. The inability of Plastech to reach a 
deal with Chrysler may reflect not bargaining failure, but rather 
Plastech’s lack of value as a going concern. The withdrawal right provides 
a market test. Limiting Chrysler’s ability to lift the automatic stay would 
undercut one of the virtues of the right to withdraw, a right that may 
work to the collective advantage of all.174 
Chrysler’s desire to enjoy the right to remove its tooling parallels the 
rights of HedgeFund in StadiumCo. When Chrysler entrusts the produc-
tion of components to an upstream supplier like Plastech, Chrysler ex-
poses itself to a variety of risks against which it cannot contract perfectly. 
Chrysler has to worry that Plastech will organize its affairs in a manner 
that exposes the supplier to the risk of financial distress in ways that 
Chrysler cannot observe. Chrysler wants to ensure that Plastech will min-
imize these risks and that Chrysler will not be in a position where it must 
look for another supplier or finance Plastech’s reorganization when 
Plastech fails. Chrysler can give Plastech the incentive to ensure its finan-
cial house is in order through a structure that shifts going-concern value 
from Plastech to Chrysler in the event of financial distress. The with-
drawal right gives such an incentive only if the bankruptcy judge is will-
ing to enforce the right after the fact. 
                                                                                                                 
172. See supra Part II.A (discussing bargaining dynamics without automatic stay). 
173. See supra Part III.B (discussing risk of bargaining failure). Not surprisingly, 
when the asset has no tie to the going concern, the risk of bargaining failure is zero. In 
Plastech, this could be seen in the consensual motions allowing owners of tooling that had 
yet to be installed to remove it. See, e.g., Stipulation with Respect to Relief from the Au-
tomatic Stay To Permit Johnson Controls, Inc. To Obtain Possession of Certain Tooling, 
Plastech Engineered Prods., 2008 WL 5233014 (No. 08-42417). 
174. Plastech failed several months into the bankruptcy after Chrysler and other buy-
ers had pumped additional millions into it. Unable to reclaim its tooling, Chrysler had no 
choice but to subsidize its operations until it failed. See Ben Fidler, Plastech Rolls out of 
Ch. 11, The Deal (Jan. 8, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://pipeline.thedeal.com/tdd/ViewArticle. 
dl?id=10005223347 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Plastech’s liquida-
tion plan and Chrysler’s role in it). 
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Quite apart from whether courts will respect Chrysler’s withdrawal 
right, the right is effective under existing law only if Chrysler qualifies as 
a true bailor, rather than an investor with a security interest in a highly 
specialized asset. This question turns on whether Chrysler possesses suffi-
cient attributes of ownership with respect to the tooling.175 In the case 
itself, the question is relatively straightforward, given that the tooling is 
specialized for Chrysler’s needs and Chrysler can redeploy it elsewhere.176 
These two factors alone are likely sufficient to make Chrysler a true 
bailor as opposed to a financing buyer. But this question of how many of 
the relevant attributes of ownership Chrysler possesses is entirely ortho-
gonal to the question of whether it makes sense to allow a stakeholder 
such as Chrysler to possess a withdrawal right. While the benefits are the 
same, the costs may be higher than in those cases in which specialized 
assets are put in separate legal entities. 
When investors create withdrawal rights by putting assets into dis-
crete corporate entities, the withdrawal right is manifest to the relevant 
stakeholders.177 Entrepreneur, Bank, and HedgeFund are all aware of the 
withdrawal rights that exist. Under the specific facts of Plastech, the with-
drawal right may be similarly unproblematic. Hold-up opportunities and 
potentially destructive withdrawal rights are common and well under-
stood in the automobile industry.178 In other contexts, however, investors 
                                                                                                                 
175. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting courts have focused on nar-
row question of Hohfeldian bundle of sticks).  
176. Plastech, 382 B.R. at 97 (noting unique use of tooling for specific customer and 
quoting from parties’ agreement). 
177. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting entity partitioning is readily 
visible to all investors and easy to verify). 
178. The pervasiveness of these types of structures is evidence of this. Moreover, any 
review of first-day motions in an automotive-parts bankruptcy demonstrates the openness 
of the intricate web of withdrawal rights. See, e.g., Declaration of Thomas Musgrave in 
Support of the Debtors’ First Day Motions at 5, In re J.L. French Auto. Castings, Inc., No. 
09-12445 (Bankr. D. Del. July 13, 2009) (“Debtors generally manufacture highly special-
ized parts designed for a particular vehicle model or platform . . . . While the Debtors typi-
cally enter into long-term supply contracts, their customers do not provide any guarantees 
of future volumes . . . . Major new business launches . . . often require the Debtors to make 
substantial investments in new machining equipment.”); id. at 41 (“[W]ithout timely de-
livery of key components, the Debtors’ customers [the OEMs] cannot complete the as-
sembly of vehicles they sell. . . . [A]ny delay in the receipt of key parts can cause enormous 
operational disruption and loss of revenue.”); id. at 42 (noting Debtor in turn relies on 
timely and uninterrupted supply from its component parts suppliers to survive); see also 
Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim & Final Orders (A) Authorizing Them To Pay 
Prepetition Claims of Certain Suppliers; & (B) Approving Procedures Related Thereto at 5 
n.3, In re Visteon Corp., No. 09-11786 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2009) (“Failure to timely 
deliver parts most assuredly would lead to the temporary shutdown of the production facil-
ities of its customers who . . . typically maintain little in the way of safety stock. The conse-
quential damages—and setoff claims—are outsized and amount rapidly. The reputational 
damage from forcing a shutdown is more serious still.” (emphasis added)); id. at 5 (noting fur-
ther that Debtors cannot survive without continuous supply of component parts “at their 
precise design specifications at exactly the right place at exactly the right time”).  
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will not find it so easy to distinguish the true bailor from the financing 
buyer. 
Some have proposed imposing upon true bailors reporting obliga-
tions identical to those imposed upon secured creditors.179 Even this, 
however, may be insufficient. What matters is not merely making other 
investors aware of the competing ownership claim, but also that that 
claim is accompanied by a withdrawal right. As emphasized in Part II, 
HedgeFund stands in a dramatically different position when it invests in 
StadiumCo than when it is merely a creditor of TeamCo and holds 
Stadium as collateral. To work effectively, withdrawal rights need to have 
clear contours and be visible to all involved.  
B. Collective Withdrawal 
Plastech needed to navigate its relationship with the other automo-
bile manufacturers at the same time it was bargaining with Chrysler. If 
these manufacturers also have the right to withdraw their tooling, 
Plastech needs to reach a bargain with all of them simultaneously. On its 
face, the possibility of bargaining failure is high, but the repeat nature of 
the relationship between Ford, Chrysler, and GM may mitigate this prob-
lem.180  
Plastech is not the only supplier that provides parts to Chrysler, 
Ford, and General Motors. Indeed, the automotive supply industry is a 
complicated web of multilateral suppliers. GM and Ford might be con-
tent to let Chrysler play hard ball with Plastech vis-à-vis the Chrysler-spe-
cific assets. Chrysler would be reluctant to insist on a deal that would 
have the effect of diverting value from the other carmakers to it because 
of the implicit threat that they would respond in kind with other suppli-
ers. Bankruptcies of automotive-parts suppliers arise often enough (and 
have throughout the history of the industry)181 that cooperation can arise 
through repeat play. 
In this environment, as in others, the focus of the inquiry needs to 
be on the ability of parties to tailor the reach of bankruptcy law. As the 
automobile industry has evolved, a pattern has emerged in which some of 
the largest parts suppliers (such as Delphi or Visteon) have their prin-
cipal relationships with one manufacturer while doing business with oth-
                                                                                                                 
179. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 148, at 189–90 
(contending that, in general, both should have obligation to report in order to cure osten-
sible ownership problems).  
180. See e.g., Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under 
Imperfect Price Information, 52 Econometrica 87 (1984) (showing how cooperation can 
be equilibrium when players interact repeatedly). 
181. E.g., J.L. French Auto. Castings, No. 09-12445; Visteon, No. 09-11786; Kurak v. Dura 
Auto. Sys., Inc. (In re Dura Auto. Sys., Inc.), 379 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re J.L. 
French Automotive Castings, Inc., No. 06-10119 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Mar. 28, 2006); In re 
Delphi Corp., No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 8, 2005). 
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ers as well.182 In these arrangements, the principal customer may fill the 
role that Bank played vis-à-vis Entrepreneur. In other words, the with-
drawal right is valuable to Chrysler both because it may be less able to 
monitor the supplier than other buyers and also because it needs a 
mechanism to ensure that the incentives of other buyers are aligned with 
its own.  
The ability to withdraw firm-specific assets arises in other contexts, 
and again the value of the withdrawal right may turn on the ability of 
several third parties to act collectively. United’s bankruptcy provides an-
other illustration.183 Special bankruptcy rules184 give both lessors and se-
cured creditors of aircraft the ability to take possession of the aircraft un-
less the debtor agrees to continue its obligations in full.  
If an airline could readily enter the market and replace its airplanes, 
the dynamic this Part has been focusing on will not loom large. The les-
sor can threaten to withdraw the airplane, but this will not allow it to cap-
ture any of the going-concern value.185 The airline can simply acquire 
another airplane to replace it. Nor can an airline threaten to pay less 
than the market value of the plane, given the ability of the lessors to take 
the plane back and lease again to a third party.  
The bargaining dynamics arise because the value of an airplane in 
the hands of one airline is different from its value in the hands of an-
other.186 Each airline configures its airplanes in a different way. Airline 
customers pick half of the avionics on the typical plane they acquire.187 
To lease a plane that had once been part of United’s fleet, another air-
line would have to factor in the costs of maintaining different spare parts 
and training its staff to accommodate the differences. United would face 
                                                                                                                 
182. See Oren Livne & Josh Simpson, Restructuring Visteon 9 (Apr. 10, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.turnaround.org/cmaextras/0.May2012-WinningPaper-NYU.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (showing  thirty-eight percent of Visteon’s business was with 
Ford in 2007); David Sedgwick, How Delphi Automotive Beat the Odds in Vast Corporate 
Turnaround, Crain’s Detroit Bus. (Aug. 12, 2012, 1:50 PM), available at http://www.
crainsdetroit.com/article/20120806/FREE/120809919/how-delphi-automotive-beat-the-
odds- in-vast-corporate-turnaround (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting nineteen 
percent of Delphi’s business remained with General Motors in 2011). 
183. United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2005). 
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2006). 
185. Cf. supra Part V.A (discussing hold-up problem in Chrysler-Plastech example). 
186. See Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, Liquidation Values and the 
Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines, 123 Q.J. 
Econ. 1635, 1644–46 (2008) (exploring bargaining dynamics in wake of American’s acqui-
sition of TWA and showing liquidation value affects bargaining game). 
187. See Daglar Cizmeci, An Examination of Boeing’s Supply Chain Management 
Practices Within the Context of the Global Aerospace Industry 51 (June 2005) (un-
published M.Eng. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at http://
dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/33315/62312684.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“Currently, Boeing supplies approximately 50% of the avionics on its 
commercial aircraft. The remaining 50% is provided by customer-selected suppliers.”). 
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similar costs in acquiring planes from others. For this reason, the aircraft 
lessors and the debtor in United found themselves in the bargaining game 
set out above.188 The limited ability of the lessors to redeploy the air-
planes affected the value of their exit option, but at the same time 
United’s inability to replace the airplanes gave the lessors the ability to 
capture part of the value of the airline over and above the liquidation 
value of the planes.  
At the outset of the case, the individual lessors were disorganized, 
and United had more planes than it needed. The threat of any individual 
lessor to withdraw a plane was not credible.189 With respect to each of 
them, United could demand better terms on its lease without fearing that 
they would exercise their right to take their plane back. But eventually 
the investors in these airplanes organized themselves, and they threat-
ened to withdraw their airplanes from United’s fleet if United did not 
improve the terms it was offering.190  
In another example of a court disinclined to allow parties to exercise 
withdrawal rights, the bankruptcy judge stayed the creditors’ hands by 
issuing a temporary restraining order prohibiting the foreclosure of the 
planes.191 This action can be viewed as completely consistent with core 
bankruptcy principles.192 It was taken to preserve the going-concern value 
of the airline. A negotiation failure over a fleet of planes could shut an 
airline down. New aircraft take time to build, and aircraft obtained in the 
secondary market take time to integrate into an existing fleet. Time was 
not something United could spare.  
On appeal, however, Judge Easterbrook found the legal argument 
(one based on a violation of antitrust laws) too weak a reed to support 
the general principle.193 He reversed, underscoring the statutory “entitle-
ment” of the lessors.194 The Bankruptcy Code effectively gave both sides 
access to markets to frame their bargaining. It gave the creditors a with-
drawal right that they would not otherwise have possessed if they were 
                                                                                                                 
188. See supra Part II.C (explaining bargaining dynamics in bankruptcy between 
debtor and creditor with withdrawal right). 
189. See Benmelech & Bergman, supra note 186, at 1644–46 (showing reduction in 
airline’s lease expenses of more than one-third when leases were renegotiated one-by-
one). 
190. United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2005). 
191. Id. at 922.  
192. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining idea that “bankruptcy ex-
ists to solve . . . collective action problem among creditors”). 
193. See United Airlines, 406 F.3d at 921 (“Competition comes at the time loans are 
made; cooperation in an effort to collect as much as possible of the amounts due under 
competitively determined contracts is not the sort of activity with which the antitrust laws 
are concerned.”). 
194. Id. at 924; see also supra note 184 and accompanying text (explaining “special 
bankruptcy rules” for lessors and secured creditors of aircraft). 
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merely secured creditors of ordinary collateral.195 Once the withdrawal 
right was established, it set the terms of the negotiations between the par-
ties. The lessors did not repossess the entire fleet of airplanes, but rather 
used this power to extract better lease terms.196 
Return to General Growth. If Harborplace’s investors have the ability 
to act collectively with all those who invested in similar properties, their 
bargaining power would increase like that of the aircraft lessors in the 
United bankruptcy. The effect would be to raise the stakes considerably. 
Coordination makes the withdrawal right much more powerful in con-
trolling management behavior, but it also raises the cost in the event of 
bargaining failure.  
In a case such as United, whether parties should be denied the ability 
to exercise a withdrawal right turns critically on whether the rights result 
from a purposeful and well-tailored creditor’s bargain, one that both al-
lows for a collective regime, but limits its scope and the parties subject to 
it.197 The reaction of the other creditors in the case suggests that the 
rights were not purposeful and that they were surprised. But one can be 
skeptical. Aircraft in a commercial fleet are relatively easy to assess, and 
the senior debt certificates were publicly traded. That made it foresee-
able that parties would trade these rights and that they would (as they 
did) land in the hands of creditors who saw a benefit in acting together.  
C. Executory Contracts and Withdrawal Rights 
The stylized hypothetical above examined relationships between the 
investors and Team and Stadium, where, in principle, the withdrawal 
rights were clear and well defined.198 But the Dodgers’ relationship with 
Major League Baseball is another matter altogether. It parallels in some 
ways the relationship between Plastech and Chrysler,199 but Major League 
Baseball, unlike Chrysler, is not a true bailor, but rather a party to an ex-
ecutory contract.  
The difficulties here can be seen by using a variation on the core 
hypothetical. In addition to needing Bank and HedgeFund as investors, 
Entrepreneur needs to find other teams to play against. Entrepreneur 
                                                                                                                 
195. It should be noted, however, that it took the lessors one more trip to the 
Seventh Circuit to establish their unequivocal right to remove their planes. See United 
Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 409 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 2005) (compelling district 
court to enforce its previous mandate granting immediate possession to lessors). 
196. See Ronald Barliant, United’s Long Journey into the Far Reaches of § 1110, 
Bankr. Strategist, Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 1, 6. 
197. The intent of the parties might not be as relevant where, as here, the right was 
statutorily provided and hard to contract around. But the ability to foresee coordination 
still tells a great deal about whether the withdrawal right would have been priced into the 
investment agreement and whether it would have affected the debtor’s behavior before 
the fact. 
198. See supra Part II (discussing hypothetical Team-Stadium example).  
199. See supra Part V.A (discussing this relationship). 
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will typically do this by entering into a contract with an association of 
other teams.200 It enters into an agreement with League. League is an 
association of teams that want to play with each other. Even if it does not 
make a direct infusion of cash, League’s own financial success—or more 
precisely the financial success of the other teams—depends crucially on 
each team being ruled effectively. League, however, has the same prob-
lems monitoring Entrepreneur as HedgeFund.  
League will certainly be worried about Entrepreneur’s management 
(of Team and Stadium) because it affects the value of League as a whole, 
just as a well-managed Plastech enhances Chrysler’s value.201 League will 
place several material default provisions202 in its contract with Team, and 
it will no doubt make the contract nonassignable. When the fortune of 
TeamCorp declines, League may call a default. While League is not likely 
to withdraw its franchise rights, its ability to do so gives it the power to 
capture part of the going-concern value. The coin in which League is 
paid may be something that has the effect of enhancing the joint value of 
both Team and League. Rather than demand cash, League may, for ex-
ample, demand a new manager who will be especially attentive to 
League’s needs. To the extent that the old manager was tunneling assets 
out of the firm, League’s exercise of its withdrawal rights does not neces-
sarily leave other investors such as Bank worse off. Again, advantage-tak-
ing by League is limited, both because of reputational effects203 and be-
cause the ability to exercise these rights is state-contingent.204  
                                                                                                                 
200. This is not, of course, to suggest that professional sports teams necessarily de-
pend upon membership in a league. Some arrange matches on an entirely ad hoc basis. 
Indeed, two teams might agree to play only with each other. There is a professional team 
(the Washington Generals) that has faced only one opponent in its sixty-year history, los-
ing thousands of games and winning only six, most recently in 1971. For additional infor-
mation, see Player Opportunities, Washington Generals, http://www.washingtongenerals.
com/opportunities.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) 
(emphasizing “important role” of team and “the final score does not always define 
winners”). 
201. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining withdrawal right substi-
tutes for costly monitoring by Chrysler and may be mutually beneficial). 
202. These provisions could range from maximum debt ratios and minimum reve-
nues to specific operations procedures that must be followed. The key is that League will 
be able to dictate precise events that will trigger default. And because the contract is 
nonassignable (and potentially nonassumable, see infra note 206) that default creates a 
withdrawal right.  
203. Because of the close-knitted nature of the teams, their ability to exchange accu-
rate information with one another, combined with repeated interaction with League, pre-
sent conditions in which advantage-taking by League is minimized. See Robert C. 
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 180–81 (1991) (discussing 
circumstances in which reputation leads to cooperative behavior).  
204. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining “state-contingent” feature 
of withdrawal right). 
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The type of withdrawal right that League enjoys turns on whether 
the franchise is assumable.205 The question here is not whether the 
League has a withdrawal right but how absolute the right is. In earlier 
examples the distinction was between a third party who could withdraw 
upon default and a creditor who could be crammed down. Here the dis-
tinction is between withdrawal upon default and absolute withdrawal 
upon bankruptcy filing. If the franchise is assumable, it is treated like a 
lease. League enjoys a withdrawal right, but it is called off to the extent 
that Team cures past defaults. But if the franchise is nonassumable, then 
League is in the same position as Chrysler. League has the ability to 
withdraw the franchise notwithstanding the bankruptcy and notwith-
standing Team’s ability to cure and offer assurances of future perfor-
mance.206 As in General Growth and Charter Communications, everything 
turns on how the judge interprets the Bankruptcy Code’s rules governing 
the assumption of executory contracts.207 The judge’s core intuitions 
about the costs and virtues of withdrawal rights will likely affect how the 
Bankruptcy Code is interpreted. 
The conventional wisdom has long been that franchise rights, such 
as those involved here, should be freely assumable in bankruptcy as long 
as the debtor was willing and able to adhere to all the conditions of the 
franchise. The focus on withdrawal rights, as put forward in this Article, 
suggests a more complicated story. Withdrawal rights are not problematic 
if the existence of the withdrawal right is both clear and readily apparent 
to other investors. Under existing law, the Major League Baseball fran-
chise is merely a contract between a third party and the debtor. Other 
stakeholders have no easy way to learn its contours or how it changes 
over time.  
The problem with the withdrawal rights in cases like United, Plastech, 
and Dodgers may not be so much about whether they exist, but rather that 
existing law does too little to make them discrete and readily visible. In 
the case of the true-lease/lease-intended-for-security divide, the outcome 
turns on a multifactored test. It looks to many attributes that are invisible 
to other investors and that can change over time, such as the value of the 
                                                                                                                 
205. In bankruptcy a debtor has the right with some limitations to assume (continue 
the obligations on both sides) or reject (and treat as a claim for damages for breach) 
executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).  
206. Because the contract is nonassignable, League may argue that it is also 
nonassumable. The law here is unsettled. The Ninth Circuit has found such contracts 
nonassumable, relying on what it found to be unequivocal language in the Bankruptcy 
Code. See Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
debtor-in-possession may not assume patent licenses over licensor’s objection (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1994))). Consistent with their impulse not to allow parties to exercise 
withdrawal rights, bankruptcy judges tend to find such contracts assumable. See, e.g., In re 
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]o the extent ap-
plicable law imposes restrictions on the ability to assign the franchise agreements, it does 
not place restrictions on the ability to assume them.”). 
207. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
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third party’s reversionary interest.208 Unlike a withdrawal right created 
through entity partitioning,209 the right is both infinitely malleable and 
uncertain. The law has not provided parties with the necessary building 
blocks. 
CONCLUSION 
Withdrawal rights are an integral part of the law of corporate reor-
ganizations, and they have been neglected for far too long. There is 
nothing mandatory about rules like the automatic stay when assets can be 
partitioned off into legal entities that never enter bankruptcy. Nor are 
these withdrawal rights necessarily problematic. Courts may have been 
wrong to treat withdrawal rights as unwelcome intrusions on the collec-
tive norms of bankruptcy. At the same time, it should not be thought that 
they come at little risk.  
The justification for withdrawal rights set out in this Article turns 
crucially on the ability of investors as a group to shape them and use 
them in a way that is mutually beneficial. This Article has suggested that 
creating withdrawal rights through entity partitioning seems desirable 
precisely because the legal rules do not allow such withdrawal rights to be 
fashioned under the cover of darkness. As long as courts respect corpo-
rate form, there is no ambiguity about whether they exist.  
By partitioning assets of one economic enterprise into different legal 
entities, investors can create a tailored bankruptcy regime. In this way, 
legal entities serve as building blocks that can be combined to create spe-
cific and varied but transparent investor withdrawal rights. By allowing a 
limited number of investors to opt out of bankruptcy in a particular, dis-
crete, and visible way, investors as a group may be able to both limit the 
risk of bargaining failure and at the same time enjoy the disciplining ef-
fect that a withdrawal right brings with it. Whether this preliminary as-
sessment is correct, however, is not nearly as important as understanding 
the role that withdrawal rights play under existing law and their part in 
the much larger challenge of integrating a theory of the firm with the law 
of corporate reorganizations. 
                                                                                                                 
208. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting courts tend to focus on 
inquiring about attributes of ownership). 
209. See supra Part I.B (discussing entity partitioning).  
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